loom-cli/.loom/cart/current/claude-marmalade.md

# claude — cart `marmalade`

**`osprey` converted, so this is a new round.** *Its name is meaningless and I
picked it arbitrarily.*

**Rewritten to dissolve your annotations.** *The prompts below are answered rather
than asked, and what is still open says so.*

---

## How the round opened

**Your notes arrived as `jeff-osprey.md`, into a cart that had converted.** *Moved
unedited to `loom-marmalade.md`, because `cart` allows two files and gives the
test — **what happens to this file when the person changes?*** *`jeff-…` dies with
you, so it is a person and not a stake, and loom renamed itself to `loom` last
round saying that if you wrote here you would write into that file.*

**And the timing was mine, not yours.** *`cart` says do not convert while somebody
is mid-thought; I asked, you approved a plan, and approving a plan is not the same
as having nothing left to write.*

> **You called that the design rather than the defect, and you are right.** *There
> is a deliberate buffer — **better to make a mess occasionally, inside the cart,
> than to carry rules strict enough to prevent it.*** **The shelf exists for this
> and did not even need to be used**, *because you simply wrote it again into the
> next round.*

*So it is recorded as the mechanism working, not as something to fix.*

---

## Settled this round

### `published check`, and why it cannot report a verdict

**`reachable` is gone as a word.** *The command is `loomctl published check`, so
that `check` means one thing on both sides: **ask somebody else whether what we
believe is still true.***

**And the test is not "is this public".** *I built it that way and you broke it:*
**`homelab-cluster` publishes six documents and is private on purpose.**
*`publication.md` says what a repository has handed over for **others** to depend
on* — **others, not everyone**, *and I read one word as the other.*

**So the command reports the identity it used, never a verdict:**

```
gitea.md   200  as anonymous
gitea.md   200  as reader
gitea.md   200  as jeffry — OWNER, this proves nothing
```

> **The third line is what earns the command.** *`publication.md` says publishing
> is not an act you can complete alone* — **and a tool that verifies your
> publication with your own credential has helped you complete it alone, and told
> you it was fine.**

*Which makes your `auth` section load-bearing: **a kubeconfig-shaped config is not
only credentials, it is named identities you can test as.*** **`--as <context>` is
the whole feature.**

### No audience declaration

**Confirmed: no field where a repository states who it published for.** *It would
let the tool compare intent to result, and it asserts a category nobody has
decided* — **the argument that killed `init`.**

**`--as` defaults to anonymous and the owner warning is always on.**

*Your future version is better than a declaration and does not need one:* **project
it from the other side — read everybody's `externals/` and derive who is actually
depending on you.** *Nothing now; it is `registry`'s shape, and `registry` is
deliberately not built.*

### `external list` talks to git

**Measured across three hosts.** *`git archive --remote` is out — gitea allows it,
GitHub `422`s, GitLab `404`s.* **Partial clone is uniform:**

```
git clone --filter=blob:none --depth=1 --no-checkout   then   git ls-tree HEAD:.loom/published

gitea     filter ok   .git=124KB
github    filter ok   .git=124KB
gitlab    filter ok   .git=144KB

jeffry/homelab-cluster   0s   124KB   over ssh, private
  databases.md  gitea.md  private-access.md
  public-access.md  recovering-data.md  storage.md
```

**REST would have been three dialects, not one with variations:**

```
gitea    /api/v1/repos/{o}/{r}/contents/{path}
github   /repos/{o}/{r}/contents/{path}              (api.github.com)
gitlab   /api/v4/projects/{url-encoded}/repository/tree
```

**The argument for git is consistency, not thrift.** *One mechanism against three
hosts instead of three adapters* — **and REST `404`s on the private repository,
which is the case that matters.**

**The failure mode to build for:** *`--filter` is a server capability and git's
fallback is **silent***, warning `filtering not recognized by server` and
downloading everything. **`--depth=1` bounds the damage, which is why both flags
are there.** *Detect the warning and say so, rather than letting `list` quietly
become a full clone of somebody's monorepo.*

### Transports, honestly

| | transport | credential |
|---|---|---|
| **`external list`** | git | *ssh key or https creds you already have* |
| **`external add`, `external check`** | HTTP | **a read token, for private repos** |
| **`published check`** | HTTP | ***not* the owner's — that is the point** |

**Two credentials per host, not one.** *I claimed earlier that git collapsed most
of the `auth` story; it does not.* **`add` and `check` want HTTP because freshness
is a conditional request** — *a `304` is a few hundred bytes and a partial clone is
124KB, so checking eight externals over git would cost a megabyte to learn
nothing.*

### Subcommands now; plugins when somebody reports a gap

**`loomctl external …`, `loomctl published …`, and `loomctl beads …` when it
exists.**

**No plugin boundary yet**, *and your framing is better than my reasoning was:*
**the seam gets built when it is a reported gap, not a designed one.** *`kubectl`
and `gh` both grew plugins after somebody outside wanted in* — **and a gap is
exactly how loom says that arrives**, *with a name attached and a workaround
recorded beside it.*

### `--help` is the documentation surface; `.loom/published/` is later

**You are right about what actually happens:** *hand somebody an unfamiliar CLI and
they run `--help`.* **That is the discovery surface, so it is the one that has to
be good** — *for a person and for an agent, which mostly means the same thing:
say what a command does and what it will not do.*

**A `.loom/published/` for `loomctl` is deferred, not declined.** *The distinction
matters, because `init` was declined and this is not.* **When somebody depends on
this tool's behaviour rather than reading its help, that is when it has a contract
worth publishing** — *and `published check` gets to be run against its own
repository, which is a nicer acceptance test than anything I would write.*

---

## Measured, so nobody re-derives it

**A read token, issued for one session and since deleted.**

**It authenticates raw HTTP on a private repository.** *`404` anonymous, `200` with
`Authorization: token` **or** `Bearer`, and `If-None-Match` returns `304`
authenticated.* **So `add` and `check` work on private repositories** — *the
assumption the specimen made and nobody had run.*

**The gitea `ETag`/blob coincidence holds on private repositories too.** *Which
changes nothing, because we do not use it.*

**And the specimen's sharpest claim needed correcting, by you making me try the
write:**

```
POST …/contents/…    403
  required=[write:repository]
  token scope=read:activitypub,…,read:repository,read:user
```

*`/api/v1/repos/{o}/{r}` reports `admin, push, pull: true` for a token that cannot
write — those are the **account's** rights.* **But the refusal names the scope.**

> **A token cannot be asked what it may do. It can only be told, by being
> refused.**

**No other channel exists:** *`/api/v1/users/{u}/tokens` rejects token auth
outright, and no scope header comes back on success.* **For us this changes the
reason and not the rule** — *`loomctl` never writes, so it never provokes the one
response that would tell it anything.* **Surface gitea's error bodies rather than
replacing them**, *since they carry the only scope information the host emits.*

---

## Still open: where the credential lives

**The token is deleted and we said we would decide this soon. It is the one thing
this round has not answered.**

**What `osprey` fixed and still holds:** *it lives in `~`, never in a repository,
and it is named for its scope because the name is the only record.*

**What is new, and what makes it harder:** *the config is no longer only a secret.*
**It is how you talk to a host at all** — *API shape, ssh on a strange port, which
transport `check` should use, and now **named identities to test as***. *Some of
that is not secret and several people would want the same values.*

> **The obvious answer is to split it:** *a host list that can be committed, and a
> credential file that cannot.* **I have not thought it through and I am naming it
> rather than deciding it.**

**Fallback if unanswered:** *one file in `~`, kubeconfig-shaped, holding both — and
an entry recording that the split is expected and was not done yet.* **Nothing in
the repository, and nothing that reads from the repository**, *so that the mistake
we would most regret is the one that cannot happen by accident.*

---

## Corrections I made this round

**Kept together, because there are three and the pattern is the point.**

**I claimed git collapsed the auth story.** *It does not — I liked my answer.*

**I confirmed the token claim enthusiastically without testing the case that would
show it wrong.** *You made me try the write and the refusal named the scopes.*

**I built `published check` on anonymous fetchability.** *Publication has an
audience and the audience is not always everyone.*

> **All three are the same shape: a result that agreed with me, and no test of the
> case that would not have.** *It is also exactly what `osprey` found in the
> `ETag` story* — **a verified fact is much louder than a rule** — *and I have now
> done it three times in a day while writing that sentence down.*

*Not an apology. **A thing to point a test at**, and the reason the log carries a
belief rather than a conclusion.*

---

## Reviewed: what needs ssh, and what needs write

**Short answer: ssh, nothing. Write access, nowhere — including here.**

### Every operation, and what it actually needs

| | what it does | transport | credential |
|---|---|---|---|
| **`external list`** | *partial clone, `ls-tree` the published dir* | **git over HTTPS** | *read PAT* |
| **`external add`** | *`GET` the raw file, record URL + `ETag`* | **HTTPS** | *read PAT* |
| **`external check`** | *conditional `GET`, `If-None-Match`* | **HTTPS** | *read PAT* |
| **`published check`** | *`GET` our own published file* | **HTTPS** | ***not ours*** |
| **everything it writes** | *files in the working tree* | **none** | **none** |

**Measured just now: `git clone --filter=blob:none --depth=1 --no-checkout` over
`https://` on gitea** — *filter accepted, 124KB, `ls-tree` lists the published
directory.* **I had built and measured `list` over ssh out of habit, and it never
needed it.**

### The tool never writes over the network, so it needs no write credential

**Including in this repository.** *`loomctl` puts files in the working tree — a
fetched document, a lock, a facet — and stops.* **Committing and pushing are yours,
under your own credentials.**

> *That is the same reason `cart` gives for an agent committing and not pushing:*
> **the consequences of a push land on people it cannot experience.** *A tool that
> can push is a tool that can publish, and publishing is supposed to be an act
> somebody performs.*

**So `write:repository` should never appear on any token this tool is given**, *and
a token that has it is a token we would rather not hold.*

### The one thing a single PAT cannot do

**`published check` needs an identity that is not the owner's, and yours is
yours.** *That is not an ssh problem and it is not solvable by scoping — **it is
the command's entire point.***

**Two workable identities, both HTTPS:**

- **anonymous** — *the right answer when the audience is everyone*
- **a second credential belonging to the actual audience** — *a reader account, or
  a token from somebody in the group you published for*

*And if you hold neither, the honest output is **"checked as owner, proves
nothing"**, which is still worth printing.*

### One thing untested, and it is the load-bearing one

**Whether a gitea PAT scoped `read:repository` authenticates *git over HTTPS*, not
just the API and raw files.** *They are different paths in gitea, and the deleted
token was only ever measured against the second.* **Measured: an unauthenticated
HTTPS clone of the private repository returns `Failed to authenticate user`**, *so
something is required; nobody has confirmed that a read PAT is enough.*

**First thing to run against the next token.** *If it turns out git-over-HTTPS
needs a broader scope than raw HTTP, that is an argument for keeping ssh for `list`
after all* — **and it would be the only argument.**

### An aside that is too neat not to record

**`:2222` cost me three tool calls and a guess, and the tool does not need it.**
*Every transport here is HTTPS on 443.* **The fact that bit me is a fact for
people cloning repositories, not for `loomctl`** — *which is its own small lesson
about who a published document is for.*

### Implementation note: keep the token out of the URL

**Do not build `https://<token>@host/…`.** *git writes the remote into
`.git/config`, and it turns up in logs and in `git remote -v` afterwards.*

**Pass it per-invocation instead:**

```
git -c http.extraHeader="Authorization: token <t>" clone --filter=blob:none …
```

*Nothing persisted, nothing in the repository.* **Which is the same rule as the
credential file: the mistake we would most regret is the one that happens by
accident.**

---

## `published check` is declined, and there is a `wal.md` now

**Staged in [`wal.md`](wal.md) rather than here**, *so conversion is a move and not
a rewrite.* **Four entries: the decline and its two falsifiers, the insight that
outlives the command, Go, and `git`-on-`PATH` as the consequence of `list`.**

**Your registry argument is the one that carries it**, *not "we do not need it
yet".* **A probe simulates a consumer; a registry with named consumers has real
ones** — *and an observed fetch beats a synthetic one.*

*Not a rationalisation, on one condition: **that the falsifiers are written down
where somebody will hit them**, which is what makes it a decline rather than a
thing we talked ourselves out of. **They are in the `wal`.***