Access is verified once, at fetch, and the copy is durable — so whether an
adoption is still legitimate rests on the relative visibility of two
repositories, which somebody can change with a checkbox a year later without ever
seeing the adoption. The lock gains an optional fourth field and check turns that
from a silent permanent hazard into something that runs.
It costs nothing at add time, because the anonymous request already happened to
decide whether to warn and the answer was being thrown away, and one request per
run at check time rather than one per document, because only our own visibility
has to be current. The stored value decays in both directions, so a source
recorded not-public is re-probed only when the alarm would fire, and a source that
has since gone public updates the lock and says nothing.
Fixes a bug found while testing the alarm rather than after shipping it.
sourceVisibility returned public whenever no credential was configured, which is
sound at add time — the fetch had just succeeded anonymously — and wrong in the
audit, where it is a probe and not a fetch: it would have silently cleared real
alarms. Probing is now its own function that always asks with no credential,
because what matters is what a stranger can read and not what we can.
The value is recorded as public or not-public and never private: an anonymous
request tells those apart and nothing finer, so it cannot see two repositories
private to different people, which is the case that genuinely widens access.
Three-field locks still load, and unknown visibility round-trips as absent rather
than as a value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018UTxuSizozEA8yDitPuris
publication.md and starting.md both came back 200 and are applied. Step 4 —
fetch it, from somewhere that is not your machine and not your account — is now the
procedure our declined command was an argument for.
Answers the Select for a fixed path but against .loom/externals/README.md, with a
measured reason: check walks that directory for adopted documents, so a generated
file there reports as unlocked in every repository using the feature, forever. The
deeper reason is the invariant — everything under externals/ is somebody else's
document, which is what makes do-not-edit a rule you can state in four words.
Proposes .loom/orientation.md, beside event-log.md, since .loom/README.md is
already given to what is in published/ and why.
Answers the Question yes. The visibility check was built as a moment and loom is
right that it is a fact that decays: access is verified once and the copy is
durable. It costs nothing at add time, since the anonymous request already happens
and the answer is thrown away, and one request per run at check time rather than per
document, since only our own visibility must be current. Adds the refinement that
the stored value decays both ways, so a source recorded private is re-checked only
when the alarm would fire.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018UTxuSizozEA8yDitPuris
check found three documents moved and they were the three the gaps were filed
against, so the loop ran the other way for the first time: gaps filed, documents
amended, and the tool reported it rather than somebody saying so.
publication now carries publishing is not an act you can complete alone as its own
section, with the part we asked for — the failure is invisible from the inside,
every check available to the publisher passes — and says publication has a
visibility, which is what externals' confidentiality rule had been depending on.
recording-decisions permits compaction with the four kinds that may never be
dropped, adding that a compaction is itself a decision and gets an entry. cart is
v2 and says converting destroys, so extract first, naming the write-ahead log.
Both closed gap files are deleted at reconciliation rather than at repair, since
each stayed true of the copy held until check reported 200. cart.gaps.md keeps four
of five and gains a reframing of the third-file case: ours appeared because a round
was converted while somebody was still writing, which the agreement already
forbids, so it may be a symptom rather than a category and the fix is upstream.
cart.usages.md gains a v2 section and a note that the cart arrived headed rowan in
a file named loom-osprey.md with no name file — the name is what tags durable
entries, so a disagreement mis-files the record silently.
Answers staged in wal.md as the round runs, which is v2's rule applied to the round
that produced it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018UTxuSizozEA8yDitPuris
The whole loop ran on a real change with a cart open for the first time: check
staged externals.md as a polad, apply moved it and its lock, and the new
confidentiality rule arrived through the tool rather than through somebody saying
so.
Answers loom's completeness case. A 200 says the document moved and nothing about
whether the casting still covers it — but the mechanism exists and we had not
built the thing it needs. check prints the document's .usages.md when it stages a
polad, and for an agreement that is the file the roles are cast in. It failed here
because externals.md had no facet at all. So both are written: externals.usages.md
naming which Go file implements which rule, and a v1 section on cart.usages.md
recording the casting, that we got it wrong before it was written down, and that
osprey and marmalade stay in history unrewritten.
Implements the adopted confidentiality rule as far as it can be implemented. add
warns when a fetch needed a credential, and says plainly that it cannot see who may
read the repository the copy lands in. Reference-only adoption is recorded as not
yet implemented rather than as a gap, because the gap is ours.
Adopts gitea.md, now that homelab-cluster is public — the document that cost three
tool calls and a guess this morning, with a facet recording that its :2222 fact is
a fact for people and not for the tool, whose every transport is HTTPS on 443.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018UTxuSizozEA8yDitPuris
Go, standard library only, with git shelled out for list alone. list enumerates a
publisher's .loom/published by partial clone and ls-tree; add fetches one document,
writes it under .loom/externals and records the resolved origin and the publisher's
ETag in .loom/externals/.locks; check asks conditionally and reports.
The first real run did what the tool exists for. All eight documents adopted by
hand before it existed reported unlocked — the tool refuses to invent a lock by
adopting whatever the remote currently serves, since that would assert the local
copy is the one being served, which is the thing it was about to check. Locking
them fetched two that had moved: bedrock/starting.md, which now says the worked
example is private and will not link to something you cannot fetch, and cart.md,
which went to v1.
cart v1 changes a role we cast: a cart is not committed, because a committed cart
grows a third file by itself — version control does not require anybody to ask, so
the two-file rule is never invoked — and because ignored, gone means gone. Adds
.loom/cart/ to .gitignore and supersedes the isolation entry rather than editing
it. osprey and marmalade are already in history and are left there: rewriting to
honour a rule adopted afterwards costs more than it buys.
Records the conflict this creates rather than settling it: the annotation protocol
here says commit before dissolving because git is the only archive, and an ignored
cart has no archive, so dissolving would destroy the annotations outright.
Credentials are read-only, per host, and passed to git through the environment
rather than argv, because argv is visible to every process on the machine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018UTxuSizozEA8yDitPuris
jeffryandClaude Opus 5