Files
peltier.io/README.md
T
benbrownandClaude Fable 5 477c5472dd skill: make the peltier skill consumable across agent harnesses
The SKILL.md Agent Skills standard (agentskills.io) is now read natively by
Codex, Copilot, VS Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, opencode, Goose, Amp, Zed,
Factory, and ZeroClaw — so the portable move is not per-harness adapter
files (forked content that drifts) but one canonical skill placed where
each harness actually looks.

- Spec-compliant frontmatter: license, compatibility (the Linux-only
  measurement story, stated up front), version/author/tags top-level
  (ZeroClaw's runtime reads those; the spec ignores unknown fields).
  reference/ renamed to references/ per the spec's conventional layout.
- .agents/skills/peltier/ mirror: the cross-tool convergence path (Codex,
  Zed, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Copilot, opencode, Goose, Amp). Byte-identical
  to the .claude canonical, enforced by CI — drift between the two copies
  is a red build, not a footnote.
- AGENTS.md at the repo root for the ~20 harnesses that read it (Claude
  Code does not; CLAUDE.md remains its file). Deliberately thin: it points
  at CLAUDE.md and the skill instead of restating rules.
- scripts/install-skill.sh: stamps a consumer repo at both discovery paths
  (--layout claude|agents|both), or emits a script-less --zeroclaw-variant.
  ZeroClaw's skill security policy blocks script files by default
  (skills.allow_scripts off) — its audit rejected the full skill and passes
  the variant, verified against the real zeroclaw binary. The variant loses
  nothing: preflight.sh still exists exactly once, in the peltier checkout
  the skill already requires, and SKILL.md now documents running it from
  there. Re-implementing preflight inline is named as a refusal condition.
- CI (skill-preflight): frontmatter upgraded to a full Agent Skills spec
  conformance check on BOTH copies (name rules, dir match, description and
  body limits, metadata string-map), plus mirror equality and a functional
  installer test (both layouts identical to canonical, variant carries no
  scripts/, nonexistent target refused).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 11:59:26 -04:00

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# peltier.io
> Spot cooling for hot paths. A profile-guided optimization agent that
> only ships wins it can prove.
peltier.io profiles real binaries and services, isolates hot paths, proposes
optimizations, and accepts a change **only** when two independent bars are
cleared: **behavioral equivalence** (upstream tests + byte-identical golden
replay + differential fuzzing + sanitizers) and **statistical significance**
(the speedup's bootstrap 95% CI lower bound clears a threshold on
calibrated hardware). A change without both is discarded and logged.
Consultants sell surveys; compilers sell flags. Peltier sells **verified
deltas with the methodology attached** — a stopwatch on pinned hardware, a
proof of equivalence, and an ROI figure whose confidence interval survives
hostile review.
📖 **Full documentation: the [peltier.io book](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/)**
· Design spec: [SPEC.md](SPEC.md) · Charter: [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md)
## Verified results
Every number carries its 95% CI and its workload, and every one survived the
gates above. Across **five phases and 34 ledger rows, zero shipped false
accepts** — including two pipeline over-accepts the audit caught before
anything shipped, each becoming a permanent new gate.
| Target | Win | Verified |
|---|---|---|
| tokei (Rust) — LTO (class 1) | +10.4% | CI [+8.5%, +12.0%] |
| tokei — three class-5 algorithmic wins | +10.7% / +3.7% / +9.9% | each CI-significant |
| cJSON (C) — number-handling rewrite (class 5) | +8.85% | CI [+7.5%, +10.0%] |
| cJSON HTTP service — p50 latency under replay | +6.2% | CI [+5.8%, +7.2%] |
| comrak (Rust) — mimalloc (class 2) | +4.6% | CI [+3.3%, +5.8%], [human-ruled](results/rulings/phase0-comrak-002.md) |
## Layout
```
crates/ Trust layer — agent has NO write access (SPEC §10)
bench-runner/ Interleaved A/B, bootstrap CIs, A/A calibration, service mode
diff-test/ Equivalence gates, corpus hash-pinning, per-target spec
ledger/ Append-only SQLite attempt ledger (mutation-refusing triggers)
report/ ROI: speedup CI → cores → dollars, methodology inline
verdict/ The pipeline in one command: gates → bench → ledger row
harnessd/ The one door the agent talks through (7 JSON ops)
agent/ Untrusted proposer (Claude Agent SDK, Python)
playbook/ Optimization classes 1–7, tried strictly cheapest-first
config/ accept.toml (thresholds), pricing.toml (ROI inputs)
targets/ Vendored OSS targets — the only agent-writable path
corpora/ Hash-pinned golden-replay inputs (read-only to agent)
results/ Calibration evidence, case studies, generated ROI reports
docs/ The mdBook site (deployed to GitHub Pages)
```
## Quick start
```sh
just build / test / lint # trust-layer workspace
just aa # A/A self-test — must yield a null verdict
just gates <target> # corpus pin + upstream tests + golden replay
# (fuzz needs a baseline — it runs in `just verdict`)
just verdict <t> <bin> ... # gates + fuzz + sanitizers + bench vs pristine baseline
just report <run-id> # ROI report from a ledger row
just isolation-check # 19 OS-boundary checks (both modes)
```
The pipeline is **Linux/POSIX-only** at runtime (Unix sockets, `setsid`,
sh-based gates). Windows builds the workspace and runs the portable unit
tests, but cannot run the pipeline.
Full command reference and reproduction steps:
[Reproduce it yourself](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/reproduce.html).
## Use it on your own code — from any agent harness
The trust layer is not specific to these targets — it will judge any two shell
commands. It ships as an **[Agent Skill](https://agentskills.io)** (the open
SKILL.md standard), which Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, VS Code,
Cursor, Gemini CLI, opencode, Goose, Amp, Zed, and ZeroClaw all load natively.
One installer stamps it into your repo at both discovery paths:
```sh
# from your repo, with a peltier checkout at /path/to/peltier.io
sh /path/to/peltier.io/scripts/install-skill.sh .
export PELTIER_HOME=/path/to/peltier.io # the skill drives bench-runner from here
```
That writes `.claude/skills/peltier/` (Claude Code; also read by Copilot,
VS Code, opencode, Amp) and `.agents/skills/peltier/` (the cross-tool path:
Codex, Zed, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Goose, and others). This repo carries both,
CI-enforced byte-identical, so the two copies cannot drift.
**ZeroClaw** blocks script files inside skills by default, so it gets a
script-less variant (preflight runs from your peltier checkout instead —
same one copy of the script):
```sh
sh /path/to/peltier.io/scripts/install-skill.sh --zeroclaw-variant /tmp/peltier-skill
zeroclaw skills install /tmp/peltier-skill
```
Then ask your agent to verify a speedup. The skill enforces the order that
makes a performance claim mean something: **equivalence before timing** (a
faster program that computes something different is a bug, not an
optimization) → **A/A calibration** (a host that "finds" a speedup between a
binary and itself cannot measure yours) → **interleaved A/B with a bootstrap
CI** → a verdict decided by the CI *lower bound*, never the median.
It drives the real `bench-runner` binary and **refuses rather than degrade**:
on an unsupported host, or with no trust layer reachable, it stops and says so
instead of falling back to a hand-rolled timing loop. A second copy of the
statistics is a second thing that can lie.
## How it stays honest
- The agent speaks to the trust layer through **seven read-only-plus-one-
write JSON operations**; it has no shell, cannot write outside a target
workspace, and cannot touch the ledger or thresholds.
- The **baseline is rebuilt from a pristine checkout** every session — a
patch never becomes its own comparison.
- The **ledger is append-only** (SQLite triggers refuse UPDATE/DELETE);
accepted rows are written only by the `verdict` binary after the gates.
- The agent process runs under **OS-level isolation** (read-only mount
namespace or an unprivileged uid) — the boundary is filesystem
permissions, not a prompt.
See [the case studies](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/case-studies/overview.html)
— especially [the caught false-accept](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/case-studies/comrak-false-accept.html),
where the pipeline over-accepted a leaking patch and the audit overturned
it before it shipped.
## License
GPL-3.0-or-later — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).