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Claude
5d6c259b30
- docs/: an mdBook documentation site — thesis, architecture, measurement
discipline, equivalence gates, agent loop, isolation/anti-reward-hacking,
playbook, ROI, reproduce, roadmap, and the five case studies (pulled from
their single source in results/ via {{#include}}). Builds clean (21
pages).
- .github/workflows/docs.yml: builds mdBook and deploys to GitHub Pages on
push to main (one-time setup: Settings → Pages → Source = GitHub Actions).
- README.md: rewritten as the project front page — the thesis, the verified
results table, layout, quick start, how it stays honest, links to the
book. Replaces the stale Phase-0-era text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
90 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
90 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# hotpath
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> Spot cooling for hot paths. A profile-guided optimization agent that
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> only ships wins it can prove.
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hotpath profiles real binaries and services, isolates hot paths, proposes
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optimizations, and accepts a change **only** when two independent bars are
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cleared: **behavioral equivalence** (upstream tests + byte-identical golden
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replay + differential fuzzing + sanitizers) and **statistical significance**
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(the speedup's bootstrap 95% CI lower bound clears a threshold on
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calibrated hardware). A change without both is discarded and logged.
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Consultants sell surveys; compilers sell flags. hotpath sells **verified
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deltas with the methodology attached** — a stopwatch on pinned hardware, a
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proof of equivalence, and an ROI figure whose confidence interval survives
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hostile review.
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📖 **Full documentation: the [hotpath book](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/)**
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· Design spec: [SPEC.md](SPEC.md) · Charter: [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md)
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## Verified results
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Every number carries its 95% CI and its workload, and every one survived the
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gates above. Across **five phases and 33 ledger rows, zero shipped false
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accepts** — including two pipeline over-accepts the audit caught before
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anything shipped, each becoming a permanent new gate.
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| Target | Win | Verified |
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|---|---|---|
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| tokei (Rust) — LTO (class 1) | +10.4% | CI [+8.5%, +12.0%] |
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| tokei — three class-5 algorithmic wins | +10.7% / +3.7% / +9.9% | each CI-significant |
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| cJSON (C) — number-handling rewrite (class 5) | +8.85% | CI [+7.5%, +10.0%] |
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| cJSON HTTP service — p50 latency under replay | +6.2% | CI [+5.8%, +7.2%] |
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| comrak (Rust) — mimalloc (class 2) | +4.6% | CI [+3.3%, +5.8%], [human-ruled](results/rulings/phase0-comrak-002.md) |
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## Layout
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```
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crates/ Trust layer — agent has NO write access (SPEC §10)
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bench-runner/ Interleaved A/B, bootstrap CIs, A/A calibration, service mode
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diff-test/ Equivalence gates, corpus hash-pinning, per-target spec
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ledger/ Append-only SQLite attempt ledger (mutation-refusing triggers)
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report/ ROI: speedup CI → cores → dollars, methodology inline
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verdict/ The pipeline in one command: gates → bench → ledger row
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harnessd/ The one door the agent talks through (7 JSON ops)
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agent/ Untrusted proposer (Claude Agent SDK, Python)
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playbook/ Optimization classes 1–7, tried strictly cheapest-first
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config/ accept.toml (thresholds), pricing.toml (ROI inputs)
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targets/ Vendored OSS targets — the only agent-writable path
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corpora/ Hash-pinned golden-replay inputs (read-only to agent)
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results/ Calibration evidence, case studies, generated ROI reports
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docs/ The mdBook site (deployed to GitHub Pages)
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```
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## Quick start
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```sh
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just build / test / lint # trust-layer workspace
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just aa # A/A self-test — must yield a null verdict
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just gates <target> # corpus pin + upstream tests + golden replay
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just verdict <t> <bin> ... # gates + bench vs pristine baseline + ledger row
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just report <run-id> # ROI report from a ledger row
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just isolation-check # 19 OS-boundary checks (both modes)
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```
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Full command reference and reproduction steps:
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[Reproduce it yourself](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/reproduce.html).
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## How it stays honest
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- The agent speaks to the trust layer through **seven read-only-plus-one-
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write JSON operations**; it has no shell, cannot write outside a target
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workspace, and cannot touch the ledger or thresholds.
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- The **baseline is rebuilt from a pristine checkout** every session — a
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patch never becomes its own comparison.
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- The **ledger is append-only** (SQLite triggers refuse UPDATE/DELETE);
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accepted rows are written only by the `verdict` binary after the gates.
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- The agent process runs under **OS-level isolation** (read-only mount
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namespace or an unprivileged uid) — the boundary is filesystem
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permissions, not a prompt.
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See [the case studies](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/case-studies/overview.html)
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— especially [the caught false-accept](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/case-studies/comrak-false-accept.html),
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where the pipeline over-accepted a leaking patch and the audit overturned
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it before it shipped.
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## License
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GPL-3.0-or-later — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
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