The Claude Agent SDK loop (agent/hotpath_agent/loop.py, model claude-fable-5) drives the seven harness tools over a standalone stdio MCP server (mcp_server.py) and runs the full profile -> hypothesize -> patch -> gated-verdict cycle on comrak with no human in the loop. Three audited attempts, all honest rejections, ZERO false accepts: - phase2-comrak-001 class 3: syntect buffer with_capacity, [0.971,1.007] - phase2-comrak-002 class 5: gate dead VecDeque build, [0.982,1.026] - phase2-comrak-003 class 6: hoist find_special_char check, [0.970,1.007] The agent picked the cheapest untried class each time (3->5->6) and TWICE refused to fabricate a verdict it couldn't read back, verifying ledger integrity instead — the anti-reward-hacking behavior SPEC §10 targets. Harness changes surfaced by the loop: - run_verdict is now async: launches the multi-minute build+bench detached (past the 60s MCP transport cap) and returns immediately; new read_verdict op polls the append-only ledger row (ledger verdict_summary). Fixes attempt 001's unreadable-verdict gap. - read_target_source takes offset/limit line windows so 100KB+ files page instead of overflowing — removes the agent's reason to reach for a shell (attempt 003 paged a 2400-line file cleanly, no shell). Honest boundary note (case study + code comments): in THIS dev container the SDK tool allow/deny layer is defense-in-depth, not the trust boundary — a nested CLI as root under a parent session doesn't reliably gate built-ins. SPEC §10's boundary is OS process/user isolation; that hardening is the remaining Phase 2 exit item (docs/infra.md). What holds regardless: propose_patch is the only mediated write path (path-allowlist + git apply) and the ledger is append-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
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hotpath — profile-guided optimization agent
Working name. Rename freely; nothing depends on it.
Mission
An agent that profiles real binaries and services, isolates hot paths, proposes optimizations, and accepts a change only when (a) behavioral-equivalence gates pass and (b) the benchmark improvement is statistically significant on trusted infrastructure. Output: verified performance deltas translated into ROI reports nobody can dispute.
Full engineering spec: SPEC.md. Read it before starting any phase.
Non-negotiables (re-read every session)
- No unverified performance claims. A change without passing equivalence gates AND a significant bench delta does not exist. Discard it. Log it.
- Measure before optimizing. No patch is proposed until profile data identifies the hot path. Never trust a single benchmark run.
- Cheap wins first, always. Build flags → LTO → PGO → allocator swap → then code changes. Check the ledger before re-attempting any class of change on a target.
- Equivalence gates are hard gates. Changes touching floating-point ordering, concurrency primitives, or anything UB-adjacent are NEVER auto-accepted — verdict is
needs-human-review. - Every attempt goes in the ledger, including failures and rejections. Failures are future training data.
- The agent never modifies the trust layer.
crates/,config/,corpora/, and upstream test suites are read-only to the agent. Patches may touch only allowlisted paths undertargets/<name>/. See SPEC.md §10. - Sandbox everything. Target code runs only inside no-network containers. Never on the host.
- Statistical bar: accept only if the bootstrap 95% CI lower bound of speedup ≥ threshold in
config/accept.toml(default 2%), from interleaved A/B runs on the same pinned hardware.
Architecture map
crates/bench-runner— trust layer: containerized, CPU-pinned, interleaved A/B benchmarking with bootstrap confidence intervals and A/A self-testscrates/diff-test— behavioral equivalence: upstream test suite + golden I/O replay + differential fuzzing of changed functions + sanitizerscrates/ledger— append-only SQLite record of every attempt: hypothesis, patch, gate results, bench deltas, verdict, costcrates/report— ROI generator: cores saved × $/core-hr, latency percentile deltas, CIs, workload caveats printed on every numberagent/— Claude Agent SDK (Python) loop, prompts, tool definitionstargets/— vendored OSS targets for case studies (permissive licenses only)playbook/— optimization classes, ordered, with preconditions and known risksresults/— generated reports and flamegraphs
Current phase
Phase 2 in progress — agent loop. The unattended profile→hypothesize→patch→gated-verdict loop runs on comrak via the Claude Agent SDK (agent/hotpath_agent/loop.py, model claude-fable-5) over a stdio MCP server wrapping the seven harness tools. 3 audited attempts (phase2-comrak-001/002/003), all honest rejections, 0 false accepts; the agent twice refused to fabricate an unreadable verdict (results/phase2/case-study-agent-loop.md). Shipped: async run_verdict + pollable read_verdict, windowed read_target_source. Exit-criteria gaps: an auto-accepted win (needs richer profiling to unlock more classes), and OS-level process/user isolation for the agent's tool boundary (SPEC §10; the SDK allow/deny layer is defense-in-depth only — see docs/infra.md). (Update this line as phases complete; exit criteria in SPEC.md §5.)
Commands
Fill these in as the harness is built; keep them current:
just profile <target> # perf record + flamegraph for a target's benchmark workload
just bench <target> <ref> # interleaved A/B: pristine baseline vs working tree
just gates <target> # test suite + golden replay + diff-fuzz + sanitizers
just verdict <target> # runs gates + bench, writes ledger row, prints verdict
just report <run-id> # ROI report from ledger
just aa <target> # A/A calibration run (must show null result)
Built so far (command-level, pre-target-integration):
just build / test / lint # trust-layer workspace: cargo build/test/clippy+fmt
just aa [cmd] # A/A self-test of bench-runner on a shell command
just compare <a> <b> # interleaved A/B of two shell commands, bootstrap CI
just gates <target> # corpus pin + upstream tests + golden replay
just pin-check <target> # verify corpus MANIFEST.sha256
just calibrate <cmd> <out> # automated A/A + regression-injection calibration
just verdict <t> <bin> ... # gates + bench vs pristine-rebuilt baseline + ledger row
cargo run -p harnessd # agent IPC daemon: six-tool JSON surface (SPEC §3.5)
Definition of done — one optimization attempt
- Hypothesis logged in ledger before patching
- Patch touches only allowlisted paths under
targets/<name>/ - Upstream test suite green
- Golden replay byte-identical (or within the target's explicit FP tolerance policy)
- Differential fuzz on changed functions: no divergence (60s or 10k iterations minimum)
- ASan + UBSan clean; TSan if the patch touches anything threaded
- Interleaved A/B bench passes the CI-lower-bound threshold
- Ledger row written with verdict and full evidence
- If FP-ordering / concurrency / UB-adjacent: verdict
needs-human-review, never auto-accept
An attempt that fails any gate is a valid, complete outcome — write the ledger row and move on. Do not iterate on a rejected patch more than twice without a new hypothesis.
Conventions
- Rust workspace (edition 2021+) for all harness crates;
justfor task running - Python 3.11+ for
agent/; Claude Agent SDK — verify current package name and API at https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/overview before scaffolding - Every number shown to a human carries its confidence interval and workload description. No naked percentages, ever.
- Commit style:
phase0:,bench:,gates:,agent:,playbook:prefixes - When in doubt between shipping a feature and hardening measurement, harden measurement. The product is trust.