Files
peltier.io/README.md
T
Claude bc305974d9 docs: rename the working name "hotpath" to peltier.io in README and the book
The project ships as peltier.io; "hotpath" was the placeholder working name
(CLAUDE.md: "Rename freely; nothing depends on it"). Replaces the product
name in the README front page and every mdBook source chapter — book title,
nav header, and prose ("Peltier profiles…", "Peltier sells…") — plus the
theme CSS comment.

The metaphor is unchanged (a Peltier device is a thermoelectric cooler:
"spot cooling for hot paths"), and the literal noun phrase "hot paths"
stays. Two code identifiers are intentionally left as-is because they are
not prose: the `agent/hotpath_agent/` Python module path and the
`HOTPATH_ISOLATION` env var — renaming those is a code change, not a docs
one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-12 17:29:22 +00:00

90 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
# peltier.io
> Spot cooling for hot paths. A profile-guided optimization agent that
> only ships wins it can prove.
Peltier profiles real binaries and services, isolates hot paths, proposes
optimizations, and accepts a change **only** when two independent bars are
cleared: **behavioral equivalence** (upstream tests + byte-identical golden
replay + differential fuzzing + sanitizers) and **statistical significance**
(the speedup's bootstrap 95% CI lower bound clears a threshold on
calibrated hardware). A change without both is discarded and logged.
Consultants sell surveys; compilers sell flags. Peltier sells **verified
deltas with the methodology attached** — a stopwatch on pinned hardware, a
proof of equivalence, and an ROI figure whose confidence interval survives
hostile review.
📖 **Full documentation: the [peltier.io book](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/)**
· Design spec: [SPEC.md](SPEC.md) · Charter: [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md)
## Verified results
Every number carries its 95% CI and its workload, and every one survived the
gates above. Across **five phases and 33 ledger rows, zero shipped false
accepts** — including two pipeline over-accepts the audit caught before
anything shipped, each becoming a permanent new gate.
| Target | Win | Verified |
|---|---|---|
| tokei (Rust) — LTO (class 1) | +10.4% | CI [+8.5%, +12.0%] |
| tokei — three class-5 algorithmic wins | +10.7% / +3.7% / +9.9% | each CI-significant |
| cJSON (C) — number-handling rewrite (class 5) | +8.85% | CI [+7.5%, +10.0%] |
| cJSON HTTP service — p50 latency under replay | +6.2% | CI [+5.8%, +7.2%] |
| comrak (Rust) — mimalloc (class 2) | +4.6% | CI [+3.3%, +5.8%], [human-ruled](results/rulings/phase0-comrak-002.md) |
## Layout
```
crates/ Trust layer — agent has NO write access (SPEC §10)
bench-runner/ Interleaved A/B, bootstrap CIs, A/A calibration, service mode
diff-test/ Equivalence gates, corpus hash-pinning, per-target spec
ledger/ Append-only SQLite attempt ledger (mutation-refusing triggers)
report/ ROI: speedup CI → cores → dollars, methodology inline
verdict/ The pipeline in one command: gates → bench → ledger row
harnessd/ The one door the agent talks through (7 JSON ops)
agent/ Untrusted proposer (Claude Agent SDK, Python)
playbook/ Optimization classes 1–7, tried strictly cheapest-first
config/ accept.toml (thresholds), pricing.toml (ROI inputs)
targets/ Vendored OSS targets — the only agent-writable path
corpora/ Hash-pinned golden-replay inputs (read-only to agent)
results/ Calibration evidence, case studies, generated ROI reports
docs/ The mdBook site (deployed to GitHub Pages)
```
## Quick start
```sh
just build / test / lint # trust-layer workspace
just aa # A/A self-test — must yield a null verdict
just gates <target> # corpus pin + upstream tests + golden replay
just verdict <t> <bin> ... # gates + bench vs pristine baseline + ledger row
just report <run-id> # ROI report from a ledger row
just isolation-check # 19 OS-boundary checks (both modes)
```
Full command reference and reproduction steps:
[Reproduce it yourself](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/reproduce.html).
## How it stays honest
- The agent speaks to the trust layer through **seven read-only-plus-one-
write JSON operations**; it has no shell, cannot write outside a target
workspace, and cannot touch the ledger or thresholds.
- The **baseline is rebuilt from a pristine checkout** every session — a
patch never becomes its own comparison.
- The **ledger is append-only** (SQLite triggers refuse UPDATE/DELETE);
accepted rows are written only by the `verdict` binary after the gates.
- The agent process runs under **OS-level isolation** (read-only mount
namespace or an unprivileged uid) — the boundary is filesystem
permissions, not a prompt.
See [the case studies](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/case-studies/overview.html)
— especially [the caught false-accept](https://bdbrown4.github.io/peltier.io/case-studies/comrak-false-accept.html),
where the pipeline over-accepted a leaking patch and the audit overturned
it before it shipped.
## License
GPL-3.0-or-later — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).