mirror of
https://github.com/bdbrown4/peltier.io.git
synced 2026-11-07 10:58:28 +00:00
Claude
e0c5018008
harnessd gains --socket mode (Unix socket, trusted uid, mutating ops serialized); the harness client speaks socket when HOTPATH_HARNESS_SOCKET is set. scripts/agent-isolated.sh launches an attempt with the agent tree confined — mountns mode (repo bind-mounted read-only, CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_PTRACE dropped; no credential copying) or user mode (unprivileged hpagent, bench-metal shape). scripts/isolation-check.sh + just isolation-check verify the boundary from the agent's side: 19 checks, both modes, all passing — repo writes, forged ledger INSERTs, trust-binary replacement, rw remounts, and userns re-entry all refused; the harnessd socket door works. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
69 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Bench infrastructure — what Phase 1 still needs from hardware
|
|
|
|
The trust layer is code-complete for Phase 1 (calibration, gates,
|
|
verdict, agent IPC), but SPEC-grade *bench numbers* need hardware this
|
|
repo's CI cannot provide. Status by requirement:
|
|
|
|
| Requirement (SPEC §3.1/§10) | GH-hosted runner | This repo's answer |
|
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
| No-network target execution | ✅ docker `--network=none` | `target-gates-no-net` CI job |
|
|
| Gates run mechanically | ✅ | `just gates` in CI |
|
|
| Environment noise measured | ✅ (measured, likely fails bars) | `runner-calibration` CI job, artifact per run |
|
|
| Profiling | ⚠️ software `cpu-clock` only (VM PMU usually absent) | `perf-probe` CI job reports what works |
|
|
| Pinned cores, governor, SMT/turbo control | ❌ shared VM | **bench-metal box (below)** |
|
|
| Separate-uid read-only trust layer | ✅ shipped | `scripts/agent-isolated.sh` + `just isolation-check` (below) |
|
|
|
|
## OS-level agent isolation (SPEC §10) — shipped
|
|
|
|
`scripts/agent-isolated.sh` launches one unattended attempt with the
|
|
agent process tree behind an OS boundary; `just isolation-check`
|
|
verifies the boundary from the agent's side (19 negative/positive
|
|
checks, both modes). harnessd runs OUTSIDE the boundary as the trusted
|
|
uid, serving its seven ops on a Unix socket (`harnessd --socket`) — the
|
|
agent's only write path into the repo.
|
|
|
|
Two modes (`HOTPATH_ISOLATION`):
|
|
|
|
- **`mountns` (default in this container).** The agent tree runs uid 0
|
|
inside a private mount namespace with the repo bind-mounted
|
|
read-only, `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`/`CAP_SYS_PTRACE` dropped from the bounding
|
|
set. Verified refused: repo writes (EROFS), forged ledger INSERT,
|
|
trust-binary replacement, `mount -o remount,rw`, and userns re-entry
|
|
to undo the mount. Chosen because the nested CLI's auth is bound to
|
|
the parent session's uid — no credentials are copied anywhere.
|
|
- **`user` (bench-metal shape).** The agent runs as unprivileged
|
|
`hpagent`; the repo is root-owned with no world-writable paths (the
|
|
launcher refuses to start otherwise). Verified refused: all of the
|
|
above plus running the `verdict` binary directly. Requires the agent
|
|
user to bring its own API credentials; a parent session's root-owned
|
|
auth is deliberately not copied across the boundary.
|
|
|
|
Residual (both modes, this container): the agent tree can still read
|
|
the repo (by design — it needs source), reach the network through the
|
|
container's egress proxy, and signal same-uid processes in `mountns`
|
|
mode. The bench-metal `user` mode plus no-net target containers remains
|
|
the production shape.
|
|
|
|
## The bench-metal box (human setup, ~15 min + account)
|
|
|
|
Any dedicated bare-metal server works; the budget default is a Hetzner
|
|
AX-line dedicated server (other options: OVH/Equinix Metal/AWS
|
|
`*.metal`). Setup:
|
|
|
|
1. Ubuntu LTS; `apt install linux-tools-$(uname -r) docker.io git build-essential`.
|
|
2. Measurement discipline: `cpupower frequency-set -g performance`;
|
|
disable SMT (`echo off > /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control`) and
|
|
turbo; reserve two cores via `isolcpus=` kernel arg; set
|
|
`pin_prefix` in `config/accept.toml` to those cores.
|
|
3. Register as a GitHub self-hosted runner with label `bench-metal`
|
|
(repo Settings → Actions → Runners). Run the runner as an
|
|
unprivileged user; make `crates/`, `config/`, `corpora/` owned by a
|
|
different user (this is the separate-uid enforcement from SPEC §10).
|
|
4. First act: `just calibrate <real workload> results/calibration/bench-metal-01.json`
|
|
— the box is only trusted after its own A/A + injection evidence is
|
|
committed. Then flip verdict bench jobs to `runs-on: bench-metal`.
|
|
|
|
Until that box exists, verdict-grade benches keep running wherever a
|
|
human has verified calibration evidence first (as done for this
|
|
container in `results/calibration/`).
|