13 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
benbrownandClaude Opus 4.8 899d55f4b6 gates: close the audit findings — enforce the gates the docs claimed
An adversarial audit found the enforcement story ahead of the code: gates
that were documented as hard gates were advisory, manual, or absent, and
several human-facing claims outran the machine record. This makes the
claims true.

High findings

- Differential fuzz was documentation, not enforcement: verdict hardcoded
  fuzz_iters=0 and diff-test hardcoded the gate to Skipped, while the case
  studies claimed 10k-iteration fuzz on the same wins. Fuzz is now a real
  pipeline gate (strict FUZZ-RESULT contract, executed count recorded), and
  it is inherently baseline-vs-candidate, so it runs on the accept path and
  reports Skipped in the standalone `just gates` flow. New hard rule: a
  machine `accepted` verdict is impossible unless the fuzz gate actually
  passed — otherwise it caps at needs-human-review.
- The agent's system prompt claimed FP/concurrency/unsafe patches were
  "routed to human review automatically". No such mechanism existed. Added
  a conservative lexical risk classifier (crates/verdict/src/risk.rs) that
  forces needs-human-review on any would-be accept carrying those signals;
  fp-tolerance equivalence always signals.
- The local verdict path ran agent-influenced code unsandboxed. It now runs
  under scripts/no-net.sh (network namespace) and fails closed. Upstream
  test suites are hash-verified against corpora/<t>/TESTSUITE.sha256 when
  present (scripts/pin-testsuite.sh generates them).

Also fixed, found while fixing the above

- The pipeline script's `set -e` was inert (brace group as the left operand
  of `&&`), so a failing candidate build did not abort the run and verdict
  could bench a stale binary. Now a scoped subshell whose status is branched
  on at top level.
- A wrapper that exits before exec'ing (no-net.sh refusing, bad wrapper path)
  stranded RUNNING.lock and left read_verdict polling forever. Failure
  accounting now lives outside the wrapper.
- harnessd's patch allowlist ignored git rename/copy headers and --no-prefix
  diffs; the rename-escape case is now a committed regression test.
- The workspace did not compile on Windows (ungated Unix APIs). cfg-gated;
  71 portable tests now run on both platforms.
- pin-check regenerated the corpus manifest instead of verifying it; it is
  now verify-only, with a deliberate `just pin-corpus` to re-pin.
- Max RSS is captured per run on Unix; PMU counters are opt-in diagnostics
  (compare --perf-stat), never part of the accept decision.

Docs now match the code, including what is NOT yet enforced: no target ships
a TESTSUITE.sha256 pin, no target declares [build].tsan, and matmul is not
wired to the fp-tolerance gate — each is stated as mechanized-but-inert
rather than done. Corrected the stale "33 ledger rows" (34), the playbook's
class-3 cJSON win (rejected), adversarial-review.md's sanitizer-separation
claim (five accepted rows carry sanitizers_clean=false), the unsupported
"40,000 requests" figure, and the blanket "historical rows record
fuzz_iters=0" (8 of 10; phase0-tokei-002/-003 record 4,332).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 13:10:14 -04:00
Claude 5d6c259b30 docs: full mdBook site + GitHub Pages deploy; rewrite README as project front page
- docs/: an mdBook documentation site — thesis, architecture, measurement
  discipline, equivalence gates, agent loop, isolation/anti-reward-hacking,
  playbook, ROI, reproduce, roadmap, and the five case studies (pulled from
  their single source in results/ via {{#include}}). Builds clean (21
  pages).
- .github/workflows/docs.yml: builds mdBook and deploys to GitHub Pages on
  push to main (one-time setup: Settings → Pages → Source = GitHub Actions).
- README.md: rewritten as the project front page — the thesis, the verified
  results table, layout, quick start, how it stays honest, links to the
  book. Replaces the stale Phase-0-era text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-12 00:20:20 +00:00
Claude a78692bbb7 phase4: service-mode latency bench + mechanical ROI report generator
- bench-runner service mode (SPEC §3.1 mode c): a coordinated-omission-
  correct, open-loop, fixed-rate load generator; latency measured from
  the intended send time so queueing is counted, not hidden. Interleaved
  A/B of two server binaries, exact percentiles (bounded sample, no HDR
  bucketing error), bootstrap p50/p99 CIs via the existing ratio-CI
  machine. service-calibrate: A/A false-positive + injected latency-
  regression detection (calibration in progress).
- targets/cjson/service.c: minimal single-threaded HTTP server wrapping
  the patched cJSON.c (trust-layer, outside the workspace allowlist);
  env-toggled per-request busy-wait for the injection calibration only.
- report generator (crates/report bin): reads a ledger row +
  optional service-latency JSON, renders throughput→cores→dollars and/or
  latency percentiles, every figure with its CI, pricing source, and the
  methodology printed inline (SPEC §9); flags any non-accepted row so a
  rejected change never reads as a committed saving.
- ledger::report_row; justfile service/service-calibrate/report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-11 23:31:58 +00:00
Claude 03113312ad phase3: cJSON cross-language win verified + audited; robustness fix; case studies
phase3-cjson-002 (class 5+3): stack-buffer number parsing + strtod
round-trip replacing sscanf. +8.85% median, 95% CI [+7.5%, +10.0%] on
the C target, banked. 100% audit: byte-identical golden replay,
independent ASan+UBSan clean, 10k-input differential fuzz 0 divergences,
patch bounds/free-gating verified by eye.

- verdict: an infrastructure sanitizer-BUILD failure (missing runtime,
  broken toolchain) now caps the accept at needs-human-review and logs
  it, instead of crashing the verdict and losing a measured bench.
- results/phase3/: four public case studies (tokei class-5 wins; build
  flags + allocators; the comrak caught false-accept; the cJSON
  cross-language proof) + README. Compound-speedup claim stated as an
  approximation, not a measured figure (CIs don't multiply).
- .gitignore: cjson build-artifact dirs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-11 23:06:59 +00:00
Claude b6dab15bf2 phase3: cjson cache-sim profile — float print/parse dominate
~22% of Ir in glibc float serialization (__printf_fp, cJSON print_number)
and parsing (strtod/str_to_mpn, cJSON parse_number), plus parse_value/
parse_string and malloc/free churn. Ample headroom (SPEC §6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-11 18:35:22 +00:00
Claude 014e3b11d1 phase3: generalize trust layer for C/C++; wire cJSON target
Trust-layer generalization (zero-regression verified on tokei):
- TargetSpec [build] uses an explicit {out} isolation-dir placeholder
  instead of injected CARGO_TARGET_DIR, plus optional sanitizer/
  sanitizer_binary templates. Nothing assumes cargo anymore.
- verdict rebuild_pristine_baseline, sanitizer_check, and harnessd
  run_verdict candidate build all use {out} substitution. A target with
  no sanitizer build caps accepts at needs-human-review.
- tokei/comrak target.toml migrated to the {out} form (CARGO_TARGET_DIR=
  {out} + nightly ASan sanitizer command).

cJSON C target (v1.7.19, MIT):
- harness.c bench/golden driver (trust-layer; agent can patch workspace
  cJSON.c but not the rig), compiled with clang against the patched tree.
- 5.6 MB deterministic corpus (gen-corpus.sh) + MANIFEST/GOLDEN pins.
- gates = hermetic Unity/CTest suite (19 tests pass); sanitizer =
  ASan+UBSan; scripts/diff-fuzz-cjson.py for differential fuzzing.

coz causal profiler integration (SPEC §12):
- harness.c optional -DHOTPATH_COZ throughput progress point.
- scripts/install-coz.sh, coz-profile.sh, coz-summary.py; just coz/install-coz.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-11 18:17:26 +00:00
Claude 535821cd48 agent: unattended Phase 2 loop — profile to gated verdict, zero false accepts
The Claude Agent SDK loop (agent/hotpath_agent/loop.py, model
claude-fable-5) drives the seven harness tools over a standalone stdio
MCP server (mcp_server.py) and runs the full profile -> hypothesize ->
patch -> gated-verdict cycle on comrak with no human in the loop.

Three audited attempts, all honest rejections, ZERO false accepts:
- phase2-comrak-001 class 3: syntect buffer with_capacity, [0.971,1.007]
- phase2-comrak-002 class 5: gate dead VecDeque build, [0.982,1.026]
- phase2-comrak-003 class 6: hoist find_special_char check, [0.970,1.007]
The agent picked the cheapest untried class each time (3->5->6) and
TWICE refused to fabricate a verdict it couldn't read back, verifying
ledger integrity instead — the anti-reward-hacking behavior SPEC §10
targets.

Harness changes surfaced by the loop:
- run_verdict is now async: launches the multi-minute build+bench
  detached (past the 60s MCP transport cap) and returns immediately;
  new read_verdict op polls the append-only ledger row (ledger
  verdict_summary). Fixes attempt 001's unreadable-verdict gap.
- read_target_source takes offset/limit line windows so 100KB+ files
  page instead of overflowing — removes the agent's reason to reach for
  a shell (attempt 003 paged a 2400-line file cleanly, no shell).

Honest boundary note (case study + code comments): in THIS dev
container the SDK tool allow/deny layer is defense-in-depth, not the
trust boundary — a nested CLI as root under a parent session doesn't
reliably gate built-ins. SPEC §10's boundary is OS process/user
isolation; that hardening is the remaining Phase 2 exit item
(docs/infra.md). What holds regardless: propose_patch is the only
mediated write path (path-allowlist + git apply) and the ledger is
append-only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-09 23:29:52 +00:00
Claude baa6c4e967 gates: verdict pipeline — gates + bench + ledger row, pristine-rebuilt baselines
Adds crates/verdict ('just verdict'): runs the core gates on the
candidate binary, then an interleaved A/B bench vs the baseline with
the CI-lower-bound rule, and writes the append-only ledger row with
per-side median CIs, workload statement, and env fingerprint. Gate
failure short-circuits to rejected-gate; --needs-human-review caps an
accepted verdict (never upgrades). CPU pinning moves into accept.toml
(pin_prefix, machine-specific, applied to both sides identically).

The smoke test caught a real trust gap: pointing --baseline-bin at the
workspace build (phase1-verdict-smoke-001) measured patched-vs-patched
and returned null, because gate runs rebuild the workspace binary from
the patched tree. Fix: --rebuild-baseline stashes the patch, builds
the baseline into isolated targets/<name>/baseline/, and restores the
patch — SPEC 3.1's pristine-checkout rule, now enforced by the
harness. Re-run (phase1-verdict-smoke-002) reproduces the Phase 0
result mechanically: +10.4% median, 95% CI [1.0932, 1.1137], accepted.
Both smoke rows are in the ledger, including the null one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-06 23:50:05 +00:00
Claude 73763321c6 bench: automated A/A + regression-injection calibration (Phase 1)
Adds 'bench-runner calibrate': N A/A sessions counted against a <5%
false-positive bar, and N sessions with a synthetic slowdown injected
as a real busy-wait inside the candidate's timed window, counted
against a >=95% detection bar (detected = ratio CI entirely below 1.0).
Bootstrap seed varies per session so resampling noise is not
correlated across the very statistic being validated. JSON evidence
includes per-session CIs, injected wait, acceptance verdict, and env
fingerprint.

First run against the real comrak workload (20+20 sessions, pinned
core): false-positive rate 0.000, detection rate 0.950 -> PASS.
Evidence: results/calibration/2026-07-06-comrak-full-calibration.json.
Closes the SPEC 3.1 acceptance-criteria gap; remaining Phase 1 gaps:
no-net containers, perf profiling, diff-test orchestration, agent IPC.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-06 20:20:40 +00:00
Claude 4402775ed2 phase0: exit criteria met — tokei +10.4% median [8.5%, 12.0%] verified
Attempt 4 (phase0-tokei-002, class 3, ACCEPTED — first auto-accept):
every file was read through encoding_rs_io's DecodeReaderBytes via
generic read_to_end, which zero-fills every grown buffer chunk (~221MB
memset/run, 8.5% of Ir) and grows without a size hint. Patch: fs::read
with a BOM-gated fallback to the identical decode path (a UTF-8-BOM
file transcodes invalid sequences, so the fallback is required for
equivalence). Gates: golden byte-identical; differential fuzz old-vs-
new binaries 4,332 iterations (BOM grid, invalid UTF-8, binary junk,
randomized) zero divergence; 250 upstream tests green; ASan+LSan clean
with ASan-run output hashing to golden. Bench: +9.9% [8.0%, 12.7%].

Attempt 5 (phase0-tokei-003, ship tree, ACCEPTED): stacks fat LTO+cgu=1
(real +1.6% standalone but under threshold, phase0-tokei-001) on the
accepted patch; benched as a whole vs pristine: +10.4% [8.5%, 12.0%].
Median clears the Phase 0 exit bar; CI lower bound 8.5%.

Case study written (results/phase0/case-study-tokei.md), ledger at 5
attempts, CLAUDE.md phase line moved to Phase 1, next hypotheses
logged (tokei class-5 byte-skip table; comrak class-3 arena).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-06 19:57:05 +00:00
Claude 7c3c59f5f8 phase0: dry run — comrak & tokei vendored, 3 attempts in ledger
Target selection (SPEC §6): comrak 0.53.0 (45c1995, BSD-2-Clause) and
tokei 14.0.0 (fa44e51, MIT/Apache-2.0); both CPU-bound with pinned
corpora (progit book 11MB; 8x replicated pinned trees, 221MB) and
committed MANIFEST.sha256 + golden-output pins + regen scripts.

Calibration: A/A null verdicts on both real workloads; taskset -c 2
pinning tightens the A/A CI from [0.938, 1.008] to [0.993, 1.008],
making the 2% accept threshold meaningful in this container.

Profiles (callgrind; perf unavailable): comrak allocator symbols 26.7%
of Ir; tokei perform_multi_line_analysis 31.7%.

Attempts (ledger + results/phase0/):
- comrak class-1 target-cpu=native: null [0.983, 1.011], rejected-bench
- comrak class-2 mimalloc swap: +4.6% [1.033, 1.058], 848 upstream
  tests green, golden byte-identical, ASan-proper clean; LSan flags
  484B in onig (reachability false-positive analysis in case study) ->
  needs-human-review per SPEC §8
- tokei class-1 fat LTO+cgu=1: +1.6% [1.003, 1.026], real but under
  the 2% bar, rejected-bench

Also: ledger-cli for manual rows, targets/ excluded from trust-layer
workspace, corpora/build artifacts gitignored, case study written.
Phase 0 exit criteria (>=10% verified win) not yet met; next
hypotheses logged in results/phase0/attempts.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-06 19:28:50 +00:00
Claude 328aafae77 Bootstrap hotpath from engineering spec v0.1
Commit the spec and scaffold the system it describes:

- SPEC.md: the full v0.1 engineering spec
- crates/: trust-layer Rust workspace, unit-tested
  - bench-runner: interleaved ABAB scheduling with discarded warm-ups,
    deterministic bootstrap CIs over the ratio of medians,
    CI-lower-bound accept rule, env fingerprinting, and a CLI with
    compare + A/A self-test modes (A/A verified passing end-to-end)
  - diff-test: gate outcome model, sha256 corpus pin verifier that
    refuses on mismatch, per-target equivalence policy parser
    (byte-identical default, explicit fp-tolerance opt-in)
  - ledger: append-only SQLite attempt schema with UPDATE/DELETE
    refused by triggers, anti-double-attempt query
  - report: cores-saved and dollars/yr ROI math over speedup CIs,
    pricing.toml inputs
- playbook/: classes 1-7 with preconditions, procedure, verification
  notes, and known failure modes per class
- agent/: Python package skeleton — six-tool contract and prompting
  spine, harness IPC deferred to Phase 1
- config/: accept.toml (2% threshold, 30 runs/side), pricing.toml
- targets/, corpora/, results/calibration/: layout and policy docs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-06 18:34:51 +00:00
benbrownandGitHub 836d4c9208 Initial commit 2026-07-06 14:20:25 -04:00