Files
peltier.io/crates/harnessd/src/main.rs
T
Claude 1ddc7b3c71 agent: patch-surface fixes from the comrak-005 transcript
- propose_patch allows the /dev/null headers git emits for new/deleted
  files (previously every new-file diff was refused as an absolute path).
- read_target_source serves HEAD (pristine) content instead of the
  working tree, matching propose_patch's standalone-vs-pristine base so
  post-proposal reads can't drift a later diff's context lines.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-10 20:36:38 +00:00

407 lines
17 KiB
Rust

//! harnessd — the only door between the agent and the trust layer
//! (SPEC §3.5, §10). One JSON request per stdin line, one JSON response
//! per stdout line. The agent gets exactly six operations; everything
//! else (shell, trust-layer writes, patches outside the target
//! workspace) simply has no code path here. Phase 1 caveat, recorded:
//! same-uid filesystem read-only enforcement still requires the
//! separate-user/container setup (Phase 1 infra gap).
use anyhow::{anyhow, ensure, Result};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::io::{BufRead, Write};
use std::os::unix::net::UnixListener;
use std::path::{Component, Path};
use std::process::Command;
use std::sync::Mutex;
/// Serializes mutating ops (git apply, pending writes) across socket
/// connections; reads don't need it but the cost is nil at one agent.
static HANDLE_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
fn main() -> Result<()> {
let root = std::env::current_dir()?.canonicalize()?;
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().collect();
if let Some(i) = args.iter().position(|a| a == "--socket") {
let path = args
.get(i + 1)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("--socket requires a path"))?;
return serve_socket(&root, Path::new(path));
}
let stdin = std::io::stdin();
let mut stdout = std::io::stdout().lock();
for line in stdin.lock().lines() {
let line = line?;
if line.trim().is_empty() {
continue;
}
let resp = respond(&root, &line);
writeln!(stdout, "{resp}")?;
stdout.flush()?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// SPEC §10 socket mode: harnessd runs as the trusted uid and listens on a
/// Unix socket; the agent process runs as an unprivileged user whose only
/// write path into the repo is this daemon. Socket permissions (owner/group/
/// mode) are set by the supervisor script that starts us.
fn serve_socket(root: &Path, sock: &Path) -> Result<()> {
if let Some(dir) = sock.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
}
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(sock);
let listener = UnixListener::bind(sock)?;
eprintln!("harnessd listening on {}", sock.display());
for conn in listener.incoming() {
let stream = match conn {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("accept error: {e}");
continue;
}
};
let root = root.to_path_buf();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let reader = match stream.try_clone() {
Ok(s) => std::io::BufReader::new(s),
Err(_) => return,
};
let mut writer = stream;
for line in reader.lines() {
let Ok(line) = line else { break };
if line.trim().is_empty() {
continue;
}
let resp = respond(&root, &line);
if writeln!(writer, "{resp}").is_err() {
break;
}
}
});
}
Ok(())
}
fn respond(root: &Path, line: &str) -> Value {
// read_verdict long-polls the ledger (read-only) and must not hold
// the lock that serializes mutating ops while it sleeps.
let is_read_verdict = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(line)
.ok()
.and_then(|v| {
v.get("op")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.map(|o| o == "read_verdict")
})
.unwrap_or(false);
let _guard = if is_read_verdict {
None
} else {
Some(HANDLE_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()))
};
match handle(root, line) {
Ok(v) => json!({"ok": true, "result": v}),
Err(e) => json!({"ok": false, "error": e.to_string()}),
}
}
/// Single-quote a string for safe embedding in a generated shell script.
fn shq(s: &str) -> String {
format!("'{}'", s.replace('\'', "'\\''"))
}
fn field<'a>(req: &'a Value, key: &str) -> Result<&'a str> {
req.get(key)
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("missing string field: {key}"))
}
/// A target name must be a plain directory name — no separators, no dots.
fn check_target(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
!name.is_empty()
&& name
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_'),
"invalid target name"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Relative paths only; no parent components, no .git, no absolutes.
fn check_rel_path(p: &str) -> Result<()> {
let path = Path::new(p);
ensure!(!path.is_absolute(), "absolute paths forbidden");
for c in path.components() {
match c {
Component::Normal(seg) => ensure!(seg != ".git", ".git access forbidden"),
Component::CurDir => {}
_ => anyhow::bail!("path escapes workspace: {p}"),
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn handle(root: &Path, line: &str) -> Result<Value> {
let req: Value = serde_json::from_str(line)?;
match field(&req, "op")? {
"read_profile" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
check_target(t)?;
let text = std::fs::read_to_string(root.join(format!("results/{t}/hotspots.txt")))?;
Ok(json!({"hotspots_text": text}))
}
"read_ledger" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
check_target(t)?;
// Read-only surface over the append-only DB.
let ledger = ledger::Ledger::open(&root.join("results/ledger.sqlite"))?;
let classes = ledger.attempted_classes(t)?;
let history = ledger.attempt_history(t)?;
Ok(json!({
"attempted_playbook_classes": classes,
"attempts": history,
"total_attempts": ledger.count()?,
"note": "a class may be re-entered with a materially NEW hypothesis; \
never duplicate a (hotspot, class, hypothesis) that has a verdict",
}))
}
"read_playbook" => {
let class = match req.get("class") {
Some(Value::Number(n)) => n.as_u64().ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("bad class"))? as u8,
Some(Value::String(s)) => s.parse()?,
_ => anyhow::bail!("missing class"),
};
ensure!((1..=7).contains(&class), "playbook class must be 1-7");
let dir = root.join("playbook");
let entry = std::fs::read_dir(&dir)?
.filter_map(|e| e.ok())
.find(|e| {
e.file_name()
.to_string_lossy()
.starts_with(&format!("{class:02}-"))
})
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("no playbook file for class {class}"))?;
Ok(json!({"markdown": std::fs::read_to_string(entry.path())?}))
}
"read_target_source" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
let p = field(&req, "path")?;
check_target(t)?;
check_rel_path(p)?;
// Serve the PRISTINE (HEAD) content, not the working tree:
// propose_patch applies each proposal against a reset
// workspace, so reads must show the same base the diff needs
// — otherwise reads after a proposal show the patched tree
// and the next diff's context lines drift (phase2-comrak-005
// burned turns rediscovering this).
let ws = root.join(format!("targets/{t}/workspace"));
let shown = Command::new("git")
.args(["-C", ws.to_str().unwrap(), "show", &format!("HEAD:{p}")])
.output()?;
ensure!(
shown.status.success(),
"cannot read {p} at HEAD: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&shown.stderr).trim()
);
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&shown.stdout).into_owned();
// Optional line window so large source files (100KB+) can be read in
// chunks instead of overflowing one response — otherwise the agent
// is tempted to reach for a shell it must not have.
let lines: Vec<&str> = text.lines().collect();
let total = lines.len();
let offset = req.get("offset").and_then(Value::as_u64).unwrap_or(0) as usize;
let limit = req
.get("limit")
.and_then(Value::as_u64)
.map(|v| v as usize)
.unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
let end = offset.saturating_add(limit).min(total);
let start = offset.min(total);
let slice = lines[start..end]
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(i, l)| format!("{}\t{}", start + i + 1, l))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
Ok(json!({
"content": slice,
"total_lines": total,
"returned_lines": [start + 1, end],
"truncated": end < total,
}))
}
"propose_patch" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
let diff = field(&req, "diff")?;
let hypothesis = field(&req, "hypothesis")?;
check_target(t)?;
// git rejects a diff without a final newline with an opaque
// "corrupt patch" — say it plainly (phase2-comrak-004 burned
// several turns rediscovering this).
ensure!(
diff.ends_with('\n'),
"diff must end with a trailing newline (git would report 'corrupt patch' at EOF)"
);
// Allowlist: every path named by the diff must be a safe
// relative path (the git -C below roots them in the target
// workspace; nothing outside it is reachable). `/dev/null`
// is the one absolute path git legitimately emits, for
// new/deleted files.
for l in diff.lines() {
if let Some(p) = l
.strip_prefix("--- a/")
.or_else(|| l.strip_prefix("+++ b/"))
{
check_rel_path(p.trim())?;
}
ensure!(
(!l.starts_with("--- /") && !l.starts_with("+++ /"))
|| l == "--- /dev/null"
|| l == "+++ /dev/null",
"absolute diff paths forbidden (only /dev/null is allowed, for new/deleted files)"
);
}
let ws = root.join(format!("targets/{t}/workspace"));
// Every proposal stands alone: reset the workspace to HEAD
// first so probe/iteration patches cannot accumulate into a
// tested tree the ledger's patch field doesn't describe
// (phase2-comrak-004 audit finding).
ensure!(
Command::new("git")
.args(["-C", ws.to_str().unwrap(), "checkout", "--", "."])
.status()?
.success(),
"workspace reset failed"
);
ensure!(
Command::new("git")
.args(["-C", ws.to_str().unwrap(), "clean", "-fdq"])
.status()?
.success(),
"workspace clean failed"
);
let run_git_apply = |check: bool| -> Result<std::process::Output> {
let mut args = vec!["-C", ws.to_str().unwrap(), "apply"];
if check {
args.push("--check");
}
args.push("-");
let mut child = Command::new("git")
.args(&args)
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()?;
child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(diff.as_bytes())?;
Ok(child.wait_with_output()?)
};
let checked = run_git_apply(true)?;
ensure!(
checked.status.success(),
"diff does not apply cleanly against the pristine workspace \
(proposals are standalone; prior proposals were reset): {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&checked.stderr).trim()
);
let applied = run_git_apply(false)?;
ensure!(
applied.status.success(),
"git apply failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&applied.stderr).trim()
);
let patch_id = format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(diff.as_bytes()))[..12].to_string();
let pending = root.join("results/pending");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&pending)?;
std::fs::write(
pending.join(format!("{patch_id}.json")),
serde_json::to_string_pretty(
&json!({"target": t, "hypothesis": hypothesis, "diff": diff}),
)?,
)?;
Ok(json!({"patch_id": patch_id}))
}
"run_verdict" => {
let patch_id = field(&req, "patch_id")?;
ensure!(
patch_id.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) && patch_id.len() == 12,
"bad patch id"
);
let run_id = field(&req, "run_id")?;
ensure!(
run_id
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_'),
"bad run id"
);
let class = field(&req, "playbook_class")?;
let hotspot = field(&req, "hotspot")?;
let pending: Value = serde_json::from_str(&std::fs::read_to_string(
root.join(format!("results/pending/{patch_id}.json")),
)?)?;
let t = pending["target"].as_str().unwrap();
let spec = diff_test::target::TargetSpec::load(root, t)?;
let bin = Path::new(&spec.build.binary)
.file_name()
.unwrap()
.to_str()
.unwrap();
let diff_path = root.join(format!("results/pending/{patch_id}.json.diff"));
std::fs::write(&diff_path, pending["diff"].as_str().unwrap())?;
// The build + verdict pipeline runs for minutes — far past the MCP
// transport's per-call cap. Launch it detached, writing progress to
// a log; the agent observes the result via the read_verdict op,
// which reads the append-only ledger row once written.
let cand_dir = format!("targets/{t}/candidate-{patch_id}");
let cand_bin = format!("{cand_dir}/release/{bin}");
let log = format!("results/pending/{run_id}.log");
let script = format!(
"set -e\nCARGO_TARGET_DIR={cand} {build}\ncargo run -q -p verdict -- {tgt} \
--rebuild-baseline --candidate-bin {cbin} --run-id {rid} --playbook-class {cls} \
--hypothesis {hyp} --hotspot {hs} --patch-file {pf}\n",
cand = shq(&cand_dir),
build = spec.build.baseline,
tgt = shq(t),
cbin = shq(&cand_bin),
rid = shq(run_id),
cls = shq(class),
hyp = shq(pending["hypothesis"].as_str().unwrap()),
hs = shq(hotspot),
pf = shq(diff_path.to_str().unwrap()),
);
let logf = std::fs::File::create(root.join(&log))?;
let errf = logf.try_clone()?;
Command::new("setsid")
.arg("sh")
.arg("-c")
.arg(&script)
.current_dir(root)
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::from(logf))
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::from(errf))
.spawn()?;
Ok(json!({"status": "started", "run_id": run_id, "log": log,
"note": "pipeline runs detached; poll read_verdict with this run_id"}))
}
"read_verdict" => {
let run_id = field(&req, "run_id")?;
// Long-poll: the pipeline runs for minutes and the MCP transport
// caps a tool call at 60s. Waiting ~45s server-side per poll cuts
// the agent's turn burn ~15x versus instant "running" replies.
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(45);
loop {
let ledger = ledger::Ledger::open(&root.join("results/ledger.sqlite"))?;
if let Some(v) = ledger.verdict_summary(run_id)? {
return Ok(v);
}
drop(ledger);
if std::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
return Ok(json!({"status": "running",
"note": "no ledger row yet; the pipeline is still building/benching — poll again"}));
}
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(3));
}
}
other => Err(anyhow!(
"unknown op: {other} (seven ops, SPEC §3.5 + async read_verdict)"
)),
}
}