# The thesis: trust is the product Performance work has a credibility problem. "We made it 15% faster" is almost always some mix of a noisy benchmark, a workload that flatters the change, and a behavioral difference nobody checked. The number is real to the person who measured it and worthless to everyone downstream. Peltier is built on the opposite premise: **a performance claim is a liability until it is proven, and the proof ships with the number.** ## Three non-negotiables 1. **No unverified performance claims.** A change without passing equivalence gates *and* a statistically significant benchmark delta does not exist. It is discarded and logged. 2. **Measure before optimizing.** No patch is proposed until profile data identifies the hot path. A single benchmark run is never trusted. 3. **Cheap wins first.** Build flags → LTO → PGO → allocator swap → *then* code changes. The ledger prevents re-attempting a dead end. ## What "proven" means here A win must clear **both** of two independent bars, because either one alone is gameable: - **Equivalence** stops "optimizations" that are actually behavior changes. A JSON parser that's faster because it stopped validating numbers is not faster; it's broken. Byte-identical golden replay and differential fuzzing catch this. - **Significance** stops noise from masquerading as a win. The bar is not "the median improved" — it is "the bootstrap 95% CI *lower bound* clears the threshold," measured by interleaving baseline and candidate on pinned hardware that has passed its own A/A calibration. A real +5.7% median that couldn't clear the significance bar (its CI lower bound was +0.2%) was **rejected** — and that rejection is in the ledger, because a rejection is a complete, valid outcome. ## Why an agent The loop — profile, hypothesize, patch, gate, measure, record — is mechanical and tedious, and the temptation to fudge a number is exactly what a tired human succumbs to. An agent proposes; the *trust layer* disposes. The agent cannot write the ledger, cannot move the baseline, cannot touch the thresholds. It can only propose a patch and ask the harness to judge it. The [architecture](./architecture.md) is designed so that even a compromised or adversarial proposer cannot manufacture a false win.