An adversarial audit found the enforcement story ahead of the code: gates
that were documented as hard gates were advisory, manual, or absent, and
several human-facing claims outran the machine record. This makes the
claims true.
High findings
- Differential fuzz was documentation, not enforcement: verdict hardcoded
fuzz_iters=0 and diff-test hardcoded the gate to Skipped, while the case
studies claimed 10k-iteration fuzz on the same wins. Fuzz is now a real
pipeline gate (strict FUZZ-RESULT contract, executed count recorded), and
it is inherently baseline-vs-candidate, so it runs on the accept path and
reports Skipped in the standalone `just gates` flow. New hard rule: a
machine `accepted` verdict is impossible unless the fuzz gate actually
passed — otherwise it caps at needs-human-review.
- The agent's system prompt claimed FP/concurrency/unsafe patches were
"routed to human review automatically". No such mechanism existed. Added
a conservative lexical risk classifier (crates/verdict/src/risk.rs) that
forces needs-human-review on any would-be accept carrying those signals;
fp-tolerance equivalence always signals.
- The local verdict path ran agent-influenced code unsandboxed. It now runs
under scripts/no-net.sh (network namespace) and fails closed. Upstream
test suites are hash-verified against corpora/<t>/TESTSUITE.sha256 when
present (scripts/pin-testsuite.sh generates them).
Also fixed, found while fixing the above
- The pipeline script's `set -e` was inert (brace group as the left operand
of `&&`), so a failing candidate build did not abort the run and verdict
could bench a stale binary. Now a scoped subshell whose status is branched
on at top level.
- A wrapper that exits before exec'ing (no-net.sh refusing, bad wrapper path)
stranded RUNNING.lock and left read_verdict polling forever. Failure
accounting now lives outside the wrapper.
- harnessd's patch allowlist ignored git rename/copy headers and --no-prefix
diffs; the rename-escape case is now a committed regression test.
- The workspace did not compile on Windows (ungated Unix APIs). cfg-gated;
71 portable tests now run on both platforms.
- pin-check regenerated the corpus manifest instead of verifying it; it is
now verify-only, with a deliberate `just pin-corpus` to re-pin.
- Max RSS is captured per run on Unix; PMU counters are opt-in diagnostics
(compare --perf-stat), never part of the accept decision.
Docs now match the code, including what is NOT yet enforced: no target ships
a TESTSUITE.sha256 pin, no target declares [build].tsan, and matmul is not
wired to the fp-tolerance gate — each is stated as mechanized-but-inert
rather than done. Corrected the stale "33 ledger rows" (34), the playbook's
class-3 cJSON win (rejected), adversarial-review.md's sanitizer-separation
claim (five accepted rows carry sanitizers_clean=false), the unsupported
"40,000 requests" figure, and the blanket "historical rows record
fuzz_iters=0" (8 of 10; phase0-tokei-002/-003 record 4,332).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two defects found and fixed in a hostile review of the whole package:
1. The ROI report generator trusted the ledger verdict field and would
mint a clean $16,886/year report for phase2-comrak-010 — the
memory-leaking patch the audit overturned (immutably 'accepted' in the
append-only ledger, sanitizers_clean:false). report_row now exposes
sanitizers_clean and the report treats accepted-but-not-sanitizer-clean
as NOT shippable, printing a warning before any dollar figure. Legit
wins (sanitizers_clean:true) still render clean.
2. bench-runner service --rate 0 / --count 0 could panic via
from_secs_f64(1/0); run_session now guards finite/positive rate and
non-zero count/workers.
Attacks correctly refused (verified, no change): ledger UPDATE/DELETE,
propose_patch ../ + .git escapes, read_target_source traversal. All 10
accepted rows satisfy the green-gates + CI>=1.02 invariant. Findings
recorded in results/adversarial-review.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
- bench-runner service mode (SPEC §3.1 mode c): a coordinated-omission-
correct, open-loop, fixed-rate load generator; latency measured from
the intended send time so queueing is counted, not hidden. Interleaved
A/B of two server binaries, exact percentiles (bounded sample, no HDR
bucketing error), bootstrap p50/p99 CIs via the existing ratio-CI
machine. service-calibrate: A/A false-positive + injected latency-
regression detection (calibration in progress).
- targets/cjson/service.c: minimal single-threaded HTTP server wrapping
the patched cJSON.c (trust-layer, outside the workspace allowlist);
env-toggled per-request busy-wait for the injection calibration only.
- report generator (crates/report bin): reads a ledger row +
optional service-latency JSON, renders throughput→cores→dollars and/or
latency percentiles, every figure with its CI, pricing source, and the
methodology printed inline (SPEC §9); flags any non-accepted row so a
rejected change never reads as a committed saving.
- ledger::report_row; justfile service/service-calibrate/report.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
Closes the CI-reachable slice of the Phase 1 infra gaps:
- trust-layer job: cargo test + clippy -D warnings + fmt
- target-gates-no-net: fetches pinned targets (new targets/fetch.sh),
regenerates + verifies corpora, runs 'just gates tokei'
mechanically, and executes the bench workload inside a
--network=none container (SPEC 3.1/10 no-net requirement)
- runner-calibration (informational): A/A + injection harness measures
the shared runner's noise floor per run, evidence uploaded as an
artifact — environments are judged empirically, not assumed
- perf-probe (informational): reports which perf event sources work
docs/infra.md maps each remaining hardware requirement (pinned cores,
governor/SMT control, separate-uid trust layer) to the bench-metal
self-hosted runner setup a human can complete in ~15 min.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
Adds crates/verdict ('just verdict'): runs the core gates on the
candidate binary, then an interleaved A/B bench vs the baseline with
the CI-lower-bound rule, and writes the append-only ledger row with
per-side median CIs, workload statement, and env fingerprint. Gate
failure short-circuits to rejected-gate; --needs-human-review caps an
accepted verdict (never upgrades). CPU pinning moves into accept.toml
(pin_prefix, machine-specific, applied to both sides identically).
The smoke test caught a real trust gap: pointing --baseline-bin at the
workspace build (phase1-verdict-smoke-001) measured patched-vs-patched
and returned null, because gate runs rebuild the workspace binary from
the patched tree. Fix: --rebuild-baseline stashes the patch, builds
the baseline into isolated targets/<name>/baseline/, and restores the
patch — SPEC 3.1's pristine-checkout rule, now enforced by the
harness. Re-run (phase1-verdict-smoke-002) reproduces the Phase 0
result mechanically: +10.4% median, 95% CI [1.0932, 1.1137], accepted.
Both smoke rows are in the ledger, including the null one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
Adds 'bench-runner calibrate': N A/A sessions counted against a <5%
false-positive bar, and N sessions with a synthetic slowdown injected
as a real busy-wait inside the candidate's timed window, counted
against a >=95% detection bar (detected = ratio CI entirely below 1.0).
Bootstrap seed varies per session so resampling noise is not
correlated across the very statistic being validated. JSON evidence
includes per-session CIs, injected wait, acceptance verdict, and env
fingerprint.
First run against the real comrak workload (20+20 sessions, pinned
core): false-positive rate 0.000, detection rate 0.950 -> PASS.
Evidence: results/calibration/2026-07-06-comrak-full-calibration.json.
Closes the SPEC 3.1 acceptance-criteria gap; remaining Phase 1 gaps:
no-net containers, perf profiling, diff-test orchestration, agent IPC.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
Commit the spec and scaffold the system it describes:
- SPEC.md: the full v0.1 engineering spec
- crates/: trust-layer Rust workspace, unit-tested
- bench-runner: interleaved ABAB scheduling with discarded warm-ups,
deterministic bootstrap CIs over the ratio of medians,
CI-lower-bound accept rule, env fingerprinting, and a CLI with
compare + A/A self-test modes (A/A verified passing end-to-end)
- diff-test: gate outcome model, sha256 corpus pin verifier that
refuses on mismatch, per-target equivalence policy parser
(byte-identical default, explicit fp-tolerance opt-in)
- ledger: append-only SQLite attempt schema with UPDATE/DELETE
refused by triggers, anti-double-attempt query
- report: cores-saved and dollars/yr ROI math over speedup CIs,
pricing.toml inputs
- playbook/: classes 1-7 with preconditions, procedure, verification
notes, and known failure modes per class
- agent/: Python package skeleton — six-tool contract and prompting
spine, harness IPC deferred to Phase 1
- config/: accept.toml (2% threshold, 30 runs/side), pricing.toml
- targets/, corpora/, results/calibration/: layout and policy docs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
benbrownandClaude Opus 4.8