Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
benbrownandClaude Opus 4.8 899d55f4b6 gates: close the audit findings — enforce the gates the docs claimed
An adversarial audit found the enforcement story ahead of the code: gates
that were documented as hard gates were advisory, manual, or absent, and
several human-facing claims outran the machine record. This makes the
claims true.

High findings

- Differential fuzz was documentation, not enforcement: verdict hardcoded
  fuzz_iters=0 and diff-test hardcoded the gate to Skipped, while the case
  studies claimed 10k-iteration fuzz on the same wins. Fuzz is now a real
  pipeline gate (strict FUZZ-RESULT contract, executed count recorded), and
  it is inherently baseline-vs-candidate, so it runs on the accept path and
  reports Skipped in the standalone `just gates` flow. New hard rule: a
  machine `accepted` verdict is impossible unless the fuzz gate actually
  passed — otherwise it caps at needs-human-review.
- The agent's system prompt claimed FP/concurrency/unsafe patches were
  "routed to human review automatically". No such mechanism existed. Added
  a conservative lexical risk classifier (crates/verdict/src/risk.rs) that
  forces needs-human-review on any would-be accept carrying those signals;
  fp-tolerance equivalence always signals.
- The local verdict path ran agent-influenced code unsandboxed. It now runs
  under scripts/no-net.sh (network namespace) and fails closed. Upstream
  test suites are hash-verified against corpora/<t>/TESTSUITE.sha256 when
  present (scripts/pin-testsuite.sh generates them).

Also fixed, found while fixing the above

- The pipeline script's `set -e` was inert (brace group as the left operand
  of `&&`), so a failing candidate build did not abort the run and verdict
  could bench a stale binary. Now a scoped subshell whose status is branched
  on at top level.
- A wrapper that exits before exec'ing (no-net.sh refusing, bad wrapper path)
  stranded RUNNING.lock and left read_verdict polling forever. Failure
  accounting now lives outside the wrapper.
- harnessd's patch allowlist ignored git rename/copy headers and --no-prefix
  diffs; the rename-escape case is now a committed regression test.
- The workspace did not compile on Windows (ungated Unix APIs). cfg-gated;
  71 portable tests now run on both platforms.
- pin-check regenerated the corpus manifest instead of verifying it; it is
  now verify-only, with a deliberate `just pin-corpus` to re-pin.
- Max RSS is captured per run on Unix; PMU counters are opt-in diagnostics
  (compare --perf-stat), never part of the accept decision.

Docs now match the code, including what is NOT yet enforced: no target ships
a TESTSUITE.sha256 pin, no target declares [build].tsan, and matmul is not
wired to the fp-tolerance gate — each is stated as mechanized-but-inert
rather than done. Corrected the stale "33 ledger rows" (34), the playbook's
class-3 cJSON win (rejected), adversarial-review.md's sanitizer-separation
claim (five accepted rows carry sanitizers_clean=false), the unsupported
"40,000 requests" figure, and the blanket "historical rows record
fuzz_iters=0" (8 of 10; phase0-tokei-002/-003 record 4,332).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 13:10:14 -04:00
Claude a78692bbb7 phase4: service-mode latency bench + mechanical ROI report generator
- bench-runner service mode (SPEC §3.1 mode c): a coordinated-omission-
  correct, open-loop, fixed-rate load generator; latency measured from
  the intended send time so queueing is counted, not hidden. Interleaved
  A/B of two server binaries, exact percentiles (bounded sample, no HDR
  bucketing error), bootstrap p50/p99 CIs via the existing ratio-CI
  machine. service-calibrate: A/A false-positive + injected latency-
  regression detection (calibration in progress).
- targets/cjson/service.c: minimal single-threaded HTTP server wrapping
  the patched cJSON.c (trust-layer, outside the workspace allowlist);
  env-toggled per-request busy-wait for the injection calibration only.
- report generator (crates/report bin): reads a ledger row +
  optional service-latency JSON, renders throughput→cores→dollars and/or
  latency percentiles, every figure with its CI, pricing source, and the
  methodology printed inline (SPEC §9); flags any non-accepted row so a
  rejected change never reads as a committed saving.
- ledger::report_row; justfile service/service-calibrate/report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-11 23:31:58 +00:00
Claude 014e3b11d1 phase3: generalize trust layer for C/C++; wire cJSON target
Trust-layer generalization (zero-regression verified on tokei):
- TargetSpec [build] uses an explicit {out} isolation-dir placeholder
  instead of injected CARGO_TARGET_DIR, plus optional sanitizer/
  sanitizer_binary templates. Nothing assumes cargo anymore.
- verdict rebuild_pristine_baseline, sanitizer_check, and harnessd
  run_verdict candidate build all use {out} substitution. A target with
  no sanitizer build caps accepts at needs-human-review.
- tokei/comrak target.toml migrated to the {out} form (CARGO_TARGET_DIR=
  {out} + nightly ASan sanitizer command).

cJSON C target (v1.7.19, MIT):
- harness.c bench/golden driver (trust-layer; agent can patch workspace
  cJSON.c but not the rig), compiled with clang against the patched tree.
- 5.6 MB deterministic corpus (gen-corpus.sh) + MANIFEST/GOLDEN pins.
- gates = hermetic Unity/CTest suite (19 tests pass); sanitizer =
  ASan+UBSan; scripts/diff-fuzz-cjson.py for differential fuzzing.

coz causal profiler integration (SPEC §12):
- harness.c optional -DHOTPATH_COZ throughput progress point.
- scripts/install-coz.sh, coz-profile.sh, coz-summary.py; just coz/install-coz.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
2026-07-11 18:17:26 +00:00