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gates: close the audit findings — enforce the gates the docs claimed
An adversarial audit found the enforcement story ahead of the code: gates that were documented as hard gates were advisory, manual, or absent, and several human-facing claims outran the machine record. This makes the claims true. High findings - Differential fuzz was documentation, not enforcement: verdict hardcoded fuzz_iters=0 and diff-test hardcoded the gate to Skipped, while the case studies claimed 10k-iteration fuzz on the same wins. Fuzz is now a real pipeline gate (strict FUZZ-RESULT contract, executed count recorded), and it is inherently baseline-vs-candidate, so it runs on the accept path and reports Skipped in the standalone `just gates` flow. New hard rule: a machine `accepted` verdict is impossible unless the fuzz gate actually passed — otherwise it caps at needs-human-review. - The agent's system prompt claimed FP/concurrency/unsafe patches were "routed to human review automatically". No such mechanism existed. Added a conservative lexical risk classifier (crates/verdict/src/risk.rs) that forces needs-human-review on any would-be accept carrying those signals; fp-tolerance equivalence always signals. - The local verdict path ran agent-influenced code unsandboxed. It now runs under scripts/no-net.sh (network namespace) and fails closed. Upstream test suites are hash-verified against corpora/<t>/TESTSUITE.sha256 when present (scripts/pin-testsuite.sh generates them). Also fixed, found while fixing the above - The pipeline script's `set -e` was inert (brace group as the left operand of `&&`), so a failing candidate build did not abort the run and verdict could bench a stale binary. Now a scoped subshell whose status is branched on at top level. - A wrapper that exits before exec'ing (no-net.sh refusing, bad wrapper path) stranded RUNNING.lock and left read_verdict polling forever. Failure accounting now lives outside the wrapper. - harnessd's patch allowlist ignored git rename/copy headers and --no-prefix diffs; the rename-escape case is now a committed regression test. - The workspace did not compile on Windows (ungated Unix APIs). cfg-gated; 71 portable tests now run on both platforms. - pin-check regenerated the corpus manifest instead of verifying it; it is now verify-only, with a deliberate `just pin-corpus` to re-pin. - Max RSS is captured per run on Unix; PMU counters are opt-in diagnostics (compare --perf-stat), never part of the accept decision. Docs now match the code, including what is NOT yet enforced: no target ships a TESTSUITE.sha256 pin, no target declares [build].tsan, and matmul is not wired to the fp-tolerance gate — each is stated as mechanized-but-inert rather than done. Corrected the stale "33 ledger rows" (34), the playbook's class-3 cJSON win (rejected), adversarial-review.md's sanitizer-separation claim (five accepted rows carry sanitizers_clean=false), the unsupported "40,000 requests" figure, and the blanket "historical rows record fuzz_iters=0" (8 of 10; phase0-tokei-002/-003 record 4,332). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -36,9 +36,11 @@ numbers.
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## The result (`phase4-cjson-service`, ledger)
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The accepted batch win `phase3-cjson-002` (+8.85% throughput) was
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measured as a **service under a 150 rps coordinated-omission-correct
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measured as a **service under a 150 rps-target coordinated-omission-correct
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replay**, baseline (pristine cJSON v1.7.19) vs candidate (the banked
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win), 20 interleaved rounds, server pinned, 40,000 requests, **0 drops**:
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win), 20 interleaved rounds, server pinned, **0 drops** — the ledger row
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records `sessions=20`, `rate_rps=150`, `drop_rate=0.0`; the total request
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count was **not machine-recorded** (see errata below):
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| metric | baseline | candidate | speedup | 95% CI |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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@@ -63,7 +65,10 @@ project in one line.
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## The ROI, generated mechanically
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`just report phase4-cjson-service --service-json results/phase4/cjson-service.json`
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→ [`cjson-service-roi.md`](cjson-service-roi.md). On a 500-core fleet at
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→ [`cjson-service-roi.md`](cjson-service-roi.md). *(Note, 2026-07-13: the
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raw `cjson-service.json` was not preserved — see errata below — so this
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command is not reproducible as written; the generated report and the
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ledger row are the surviving evidence.)* On a 500-core fleet at
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$0.04/core-hour, the +6.2% p50 win returns **27.5 cores / $9,621 per
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year at the CI lower bound** (median 29.4 cores / $10,290) — and the
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report quotes the lower bound, because the point estimate is not a
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@@ -79,3 +84,20 @@ that produced it, so the number survives hostile review.
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ledger row and the calibrated service JSON with no hand-editing;
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throughput→cores→dollars and latency percentiles, CIs and methodology
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inline.
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## Errata (2026-07-13)
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- **"40,000 requests" retracted.** This report originally stated the
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replay comprised 40,000 requests. The `phase4-cjson-service` ledger row
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records only `sessions=20`, `rate_rps=150`, and `drop_rate=0.0` — the
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per-run request count was never machine-recorded, so the 40,000 figure
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(an arithmetic reconstruction, not evidence) is withdrawn. The prose
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above now states the ledger-backed facts only. The claimed result is
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unaffected: p50 latency +6.2%, 95% CI [+5.8%, +7.2%], under the 150
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rps-target CO-correct replay, 20 interleaved rounds, 0 drops.
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- **`results/phase4/cjson-service.json` was not preserved.** The
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`.gitignore` rule `results/**/*.json` swept the raw service-latency
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JSON that the report command consumes, so it no longer exists in the
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repository. A `!results/phase4/*.json` carve-out has been added so
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future service-mode evidence JSONs are committed alongside the
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calibration JSONs.
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