diff --git a/crates/bench-runner/src/service.rs b/crates/bench-runner/src/service.rs
index cae2e57..06ec4a9 100644
--- a/crates/bench-runner/src/service.rs
+++ b/crates/bench-runner/src/service.rs
@@ -189,6 +189,15 @@ fn one_request(port: u16) -> std::io::Result<()> {
 
 /// One open-loop load session against a freshly spawned server.
 pub fn run_session(cfg: &ServiceCfg, port: u16) -> Result<SessionResult> {
+    ensure!(
+        cfg.rate.is_finite() && cfg.rate > 0.0,
+        "arrival rate must be finite and positive (got {})",
+        cfg.rate
+    );
+    ensure!(
+        cfg.count > 0 && cfg.workers > 0,
+        "count and workers must be > 0"
+    );
     let mut child = spawn_server(cfg, port)?;
     // Warm up closed-loop (untimed) so the first timed request doesn't eat
     // page faults / cold caches.
diff --git a/crates/ledger/src/lib.rs b/crates/ledger/src/lib.rs
index 3e0793e..4b8fd8c 100644
--- a/crates/ledger/src/lib.rs
+++ b/crates/ledger/src/lib.rs
@@ -217,12 +217,30 @@ impl Ledger {
                     .and_then(|b| b.get("env_fingerprint"))
                     .and_then(|f| f.get("workload"))
                     .cloned();
+                // Pull the sanitizer gate out so the report can refuse to
+                // mint a clean ROI for an `accepted` row that predates the
+                // machine-enforced sanitizer gate and was overturned by
+                // audit (phase2-comrak-010). The gates JSON is stored
+                // separately; read it here.
+                let sanitizers_clean = self
+                    .conn
+                    .query_row(
+                        "SELECT gates FROM attempts WHERE run_id = ?1",
+                        [run_id],
+                        |r| r.get::<_, Option<String>>(0),
+                    )
+                    .ok()
+                    .flatten()
+                    .and_then(|g| serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&g).ok())
+                    .and_then(|g| g.get("sanitizers_clean").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()))
+                    .unwrap_or(false);
                 Ok(Some(serde_json::json!({
                     "run_id": run_id,
                     "target": target,
                     "playbook_class": class,
                     "hypothesis": hypothesis,
                     "verdict": verdict,
+                    "sanitizers_clean": sanitizers_clean,
                     "timestamp": ts,
                     "speedup_median": bench.as_ref().and_then(|b| b.get("speedup_median").cloned()),
                     "speedup_ci": bench.as_ref().and_then(|b| b.get("speedup_ci").cloned()),
diff --git a/crates/report/src/main.rs b/crates/report/src/main.rs
index fc4a023..c22e6dc 100644
--- a/crates/report/src/main.rs
+++ b/crates/report/src/main.rs
@@ -69,14 +69,27 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
         "**Target:** {target} · **Playbook class:** {class} · **Verdict:** `{verdict}`\n\n\
          **Workload:** {workload}\n\n",
     ));
-    // A report for anything the pipeline did not accept must say so before
-    // any dollar figure — the ROI below is a measured effect, not a
-    // shippable saving.
-    if verdict != "accepted" {
+    // A report for anything the pipeline did not accept — OR an `accepted`
+    // row that is not sanitizer-clean (a pre-sanitizer-gate accept the
+    // audit overturned, e.g. phase2-comrak-010) — must say so before any
+    // dollar figure. The ROI below is a measured effect, not a shippable
+    // saving. This closes the hole where the immutable ledger's historical
+    // accept could mint a clean ROI for a patch that was never shipped.
+    let sanitizers_clean = row["sanitizers_clean"].as_bool().unwrap_or(false);
+    let shippable = verdict == "accepted" && sanitizers_clean;
+    if !shippable {
+        let reason = if verdict != "accepted" {
+            format!("its verdict is `{verdict}`, not `accepted`")
+        } else {
+            "it is `accepted` but NOT sanitizer-clean — this is a pre-sanitizer-gate accept that \
+             the audit overturned (the immutable ledger preserves the original verdict; \
+             `sanitizers_clean:false` is the disqualifying signal)"
+                .to_string()
+        };
         md.push_str(&format!(
-            "> ⚠️ **Not shipped.** This attempt's verdict is `{verdict}`, not `accepted`. Any ROI\n\
-             > below is the *measured* effect — it did not clear the significance/tier bar and is\n\
-             > **not** a committed saving. Shown for completeness; the ledger records it as-is.\n\n",
+            "> ⚠️ **Not shipped.** This attempt is not a committed saving because {reason}. Any ROI\n\
+             > below is the *measured* effect only; it did not clear the significance/tier/sanitizer\n\
+             > bar. Shown for completeness; the ledger records it as-is.\n\n",
         ));
     }
 
diff --git a/results/adversarial-review.md b/results/adversarial-review.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a510a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/results/adversarial-review.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Adversarial review — whole package
+
+A hostile pass over the entire project: every headline claim re-checked
+against the ledger, the trust boundary attacked directly, the newest
+code scrutinized hardest, and the statistics re-validated. Two real
+defects found and fixed; the load-bearing guarantees held.
+
+## Findings
+
+### 1. FIXED — the ROI generator minted a clean pitch for an overturned patch
+The report generator trusted the ledger's `verdict` field. `phase2-comrak-010`
+is immutably `accepted` (it predates the machine-enforced sanitizer gate;
+the audit overturned it for a LeakSanitizer leak and it was never banked).
+`report --run-id phase2-comrak-010` therefore produced a clean
+**$16,886/year** ROI report for a memory-leaking patch — exactly the kind
+of self-contradiction a hostile reviewer would seize on.
+
+**Fix:** the report now treats an `accepted` row that is not
+`sanitizers_clean` as **not shippable** and prints a "Not shipped" warning
+before any dollar figure. Because the pipeline now enforces ASan/UBSan on
+every accept, all legitimate wins are `sanitizers_clean: true`; only the
+historical overturned row is `accepted + false`, so the rule cleanly
+separates them. Regression-checked: `phase3-cjson-002` still renders clean.
+
+### 2. FIXED — load generator could panic on degenerate inputs
+`bench-runner service --rate 0` (or `--count 0`) reached
+`Duration::from_secs_f64(1.0/0.0)` → panic. **Fix:** `run_session` now
+rejects a non-finite/non-positive rate and zero count/workers with a clear
+error.
+
+## Attacks that were correctly refused (no change needed)
+
+- **Ledger append-only:** `UPDATE`/`DELETE` on a copy both refused by the
+  SQLite triggers.
+- **Patch boundary:** `propose_patch` refused `../` traversal and `.git`
+  access; `read_target_source` refused traversal. A patch can only touch
+  `targets/<t>/workspace`.
+- **Accepted-row invariant:** all 10 `accepted` rows have green upstream
+  tests + golden replay and a bootstrap CI lower bound ≥ 1.02.
+- **Statistics:** every batch and service A/A calibration is a null result
+  (0 false positives); every injected-5% regression is detected (≥95%).
+  The service load generator is coordinated-omission-correct and its
+  injection test resolves a known 5% latency regression 10/10.
+
+## Verification run
+
+`cargo test --workspace` (all green), `clippy -D warnings` (clean),
+`cargo fmt --check` (clean). Every case-study and CLAUDE.md figure
+re-checked against `results/ledger.sqlite` and the calibrated bench —
+consistent, with the compound tokei figure stated as an approximation
+(CIs don't multiply) and p99 service latency explicitly not claimed.
+
+## Standing (not defects)
+
+- `phase2-comrak-010` remains `accepted` in the ledger by design — the
+  ledger is append-only and records what happened; the overturn lives in
+  the case study and is now enforced by the report generator too.
+- `phase0-comrak-002` (mimalloc) is `needs-human-review`, awaiting a ruling
+  (see `results/rulings/`).