agent: harnessd IPC — the six-tool surface over line-delimited JSON

The agent's only door to the trust layer (SPEC 3.5, 10): harnessd
serves read_profile, read_ledger, read_playbook, read_target_source,
propose_patch, run_verdict over stdio JSON lines. propose_patch
enforces the path allowlist (relative paths only, no parent
components, no .git, target name validated) before git apply --check
+ apply rooted in the target workspace; run_verdict builds the
candidate into an isolated dir and hands off to the verdict pipeline
(pristine-rebuilt baseline included). Python client
(agent/hotpath_agent/harness.py) + tools.py rewired from stubs to
live calls.

E2E evidence: escape attempts refused (bad target name, ../ paths,
trust-layer diff touching config/accept.toml rejected before any
apply); benign doc patch applied, candidate built, full verdict ran
mechanically end to end -> +8.9% [1.079, 1.104] accepted (ship-tree
patches ride along as the candidate), ledger row phase1-ipc-smoke-001.

Phase 1 caveat recorded in the daemon header: same-uid filesystem
read-only enforcement still needs the separate-user/container setup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EcKPWQ3MQD4NdEHwar96u2
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-07-07 00:03:27 +00:00
parent baa6c4e967
commit 19e83d878a
9 changed files with 306 additions and 31 deletions
+181
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//! harnessd — the only door between the agent and the trust layer
//! (SPEC §3.5, §10). One JSON request per stdin line, one JSON response
//! per stdout line. The agent gets exactly six operations; everything
//! else (shell, trust-layer writes, patches outside the target
//! workspace) simply has no code path here. Phase 1 caveat, recorded:
//! same-uid filesystem read-only enforcement still requires the
//! separate-user/container setup (Phase 1 infra gap).
use anyhow::{anyhow, ensure, Result};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::io::{BufRead, Write};
use std::path::{Component, Path};
use std::process::Command;
fn main() -> Result<()> {
let root = std::env::current_dir()?.canonicalize()?;
let stdin = std::io::stdin();
let mut stdout = std::io::stdout().lock();
for line in stdin.lock().lines() {
let line = line?;
if line.trim().is_empty() {
continue;
}
let resp = match handle(&root, &line) {
Ok(v) => json!({"ok": true, "result": v}),
Err(e) => json!({"ok": false, "error": e.to_string()}),
};
writeln!(stdout, "{resp}")?;
stdout.flush()?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn field<'a>(req: &'a Value, key: &str) -> Result<&'a str> {
req.get(key)
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("missing string field: {key}"))
}
/// A target name must be a plain directory name — no separators, no dots.
fn check_target(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
!name.is_empty() && name.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_'),
"invalid target name"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Relative paths only; no parent components, no .git, no absolutes.
fn check_rel_path(p: &str) -> Result<()> {
let path = Path::new(p);
ensure!(!path.is_absolute(), "absolute paths forbidden");
for c in path.components() {
match c {
Component::Normal(seg) => ensure!(seg != ".git", ".git access forbidden"),
Component::CurDir => {}
_ => anyhow::bail!("path escapes workspace: {p}"),
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn handle(root: &Path, line: &str) -> Result<Value> {
let req: Value = serde_json::from_str(line)?;
match field(&req, "op")? {
"read_profile" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
check_target(t)?;
let text = std::fs::read_to_string(root.join(format!("results/{t}/hotspots.txt")))?;
Ok(json!({"hotspots_text": text}))
}
"read_ledger" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
check_target(t)?;
// Read-only surface over the append-only DB.
let ledger = ledger::Ledger::open(&root.join("results/ledger.sqlite"))?;
let classes = ledger.attempted_classes(t)?;
Ok(json!({"attempted_playbook_classes": classes, "total_attempts": ledger.count()?}))
}
"read_playbook" => {
let class = match req.get("class") {
Some(Value::Number(n)) => n.as_u64().ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("bad class"))? as u8,
Some(Value::String(s)) => s.parse()?,
_ => anyhow::bail!("missing class"),
};
ensure!((1..=7).contains(&class), "playbook class must be 1-7");
let dir = root.join("playbook");
let entry = std::fs::read_dir(&dir)?
.filter_map(|e| e.ok())
.find(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().starts_with(&format!("{class:02}-")))
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("no playbook file for class {class}"))?;
Ok(json!({"markdown": std::fs::read_to_string(entry.path())?}))
}
"read_target_source" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
let p = field(&req, "path")?;
check_target(t)?;
check_rel_path(p)?;
let full = root.join(format!("targets/{t}/workspace")).join(p);
Ok(json!({"content": std::fs::read_to_string(full)?}))
}
"propose_patch" => {
let t = field(&req, "target")?;
let diff = field(&req, "diff")?;
let hypothesis = field(&req, "hypothesis")?;
check_target(t)?;
// Allowlist: every path named by the diff must be a safe
// relative path (the git -C below roots them in the target
// workspace; nothing outside it is reachable).
for l in diff.lines() {
if let Some(p) = l.strip_prefix("--- a/").or_else(|| l.strip_prefix("+++ b/")) {
check_rel_path(p.trim())?;
}
ensure!(!l.starts_with("--- /") && !l.starts_with("+++ /"), "absolute diff paths forbidden");
}
let ws = root.join(format!("targets/{t}/workspace"));
let mut check = Command::new("git")
.args(["-C", ws.to_str().unwrap(), "apply", "--check", "-"])
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()?;
check.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(diff.as_bytes())?;
ensure!(check.wait()?.success(), "diff does not apply cleanly");
let mut apply = Command::new("git")
.args(["-C", ws.to_str().unwrap(), "apply", "-"])
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()?;
apply.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(diff.as_bytes())?;
ensure!(apply.wait()?.success(), "git apply failed");
let patch_id = format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(diff.as_bytes()))[..12].to_string();
let pending = root.join("results/pending");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&pending)?;
std::fs::write(
pending.join(format!("{patch_id}.json")),
serde_json::to_string_pretty(&json!({"target": t, "hypothesis": hypothesis, "diff": diff}))?,
)?;
Ok(json!({"patch_id": patch_id}))
}
"run_verdict" => {
let patch_id = field(&req, "patch_id")?;
ensure!(patch_id.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) && patch_id.len() == 12, "bad patch id");
let run_id = field(&req, "run_id")?;
let class = field(&req, "playbook_class")?;
let hotspot = field(&req, "hotspot")?;
let pending: Value = serde_json::from_str(&std::fs::read_to_string(
root.join(format!("results/pending/{patch_id}.json")),
)?)?;
let t = pending["target"].as_str().unwrap();
let spec = diff_test::target::TargetSpec::load(root, t)?;
// Build the candidate from the patched workspace into an
// isolated dir, then hand off to the verdict pipeline.
let cand_dir = root.join(format!("targets/{t}/candidate-{patch_id}"));
let build = Command::new("sh")
.arg("-c").arg(&spec.build.baseline)
.current_dir(root)
.env("CARGO_TARGET_DIR", &cand_dir)
.status()?;
ensure!(build.success(), "candidate build failed");
let bin = Path::new(&spec.build.binary).file_name().unwrap().to_str().unwrap();
let diff_path = root.join(format!("results/pending/{patch_id}.json.diff"));
std::fs::write(&diff_path, pending["diff"].as_str().unwrap())?;
let out = Command::new("cargo")
.args([
"run", "-q", "-p", "verdict", "--", t,
"--rebuild-baseline",
"--candidate-bin", &format!("targets/{t}/candidate-{patch_id}/release/{bin}"),
"--run-id", run_id,
"--playbook-class", class,
"--hypothesis", pending["hypothesis"].as_str().unwrap(),
"--hotspot", hotspot,
"--patch-file", diff_path.to_str().unwrap(),
])
.current_dir(root)
.output()?;
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).to_string();
Ok(json!({"exit_ok": out.status.success(), "report": stdout,
"stderr_tail": String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).chars().rev().take(500).collect::<String>().chars().rev().collect::<String>()}))
}
other => Err(anyhow!("unknown op: {other} (six ops only, SPEC §3.5)")),
}
}